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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS UNDER
THE N. R. A. AND A. A. A.
THE variety of problems dealt with by the NRA and AAA suggests that orders
for the enforcement of codes and marketing agreements, and for the revocation
of licenses issued thereunder, may be accorded equally varying degrees of finality
by the courts. Scattered through most of the codes drawn up under the NRA are
a number of provisions declarative of mores and business ethics accepted and now
prevailing within the industries concerned.' Thus many of the codes condemn as
1. Late in November a study revealed that of 85 codes, 52 regulated trade practices. The
most frequently condemned practices, and the number of codes in which they appeared, were:
secret rebates, 44; false marking or misbranding, 36; misrepresentation or false and mislead-
ing advertising, 35; defamation, 27; commercial bribery, 26; piracy of trade mark, 22;
giving of prizes, premiums or gifts, 19; shipment on consignment, 13; piracy of design, 13;
advertising allowances, 8; combination sales, 2. N. R. A. Release No. 2763. Prohibitions of
the last four practices, with the exception of style piracy, are probably declarative of desired
rather than presently accepted business ethics. Unfair practices, especially various forms of
rebates, are also proscribed by AAA marketing agreements and licenses. See Marketing
Agreement (No. 2) for California Cling Peaches, License No. 2, Art. IV.
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unfair such practices as commercial bribery,2 trade mark infringement, 3 style
piracy,4 and misleading advertising.5 Other provisions are addressed more
directly to the problems of particular industries. One code forbids the sale of a
described type of machinery, known by the trade to be unsatisfactory; 6 another
prohibits the acceptance of orders incomplete as to terms and prices; 7 while
a third forbids sales by dealers in territory enfranchised to a competitor.8 Ad-
ministrative enforcement of provisions such as these does not involve imposition
upon industry of regulations and standards drawn up by government, but in-
stead amounts only to the securing of compliance in individual cases with
standards already conformed to voluntarily by a majority of the members of an
industry. The Federal Trade Commission has for years been engaged in similar
efforts to control single violations of accepted standards; and despite its notori-
ous lack of success in securing judicial sanction for its findings in other respects,
the Commission in these cases has been conspicuously successful. A large pro-
portion of such disputes have been effectively disposed of without appeals; and
in those that have reached the courts, decisions reversing the Commission have
occurred only occasionally. 9 The prediction seems justified, therefore, that when
similar orders arising under the NRA are tested in the courts, a reasonable
degree of administrative finality will be allowed.10
2. See, e. g., Code for the Iron and Steel Industry, Schedule H; Code for the Bituminous
Coal Industry, Art. VI (12); Code for the Luggage and Fancy Leather Goods Industry,
Art. VI (4).
3. See, e: g., Code for the Handkerchief Industry, Art. VII (2); Code for the Boot and
Shoe Industry, Art. VIII (1) (c).
4. See, e. g., Code for the Corset and Brassiere Industry, Art. IX (k); Code for the
Funeral Supply Industry, Art. IX (r).
5. See, e. g., Code for the Women's Belt Industry, Art. VI (D); Code for the Toy and
Playthings Industry, Art. VII (6); Code for the M'&achine Tool and Forging Machinery In-
dustry, Art. 11 (b).
6. Code for the Oil Burner Industry, Art. VI (12).
7. Code for the Fire Extinguishing Appliance Manufacturing Industry, Art. VII (10).
8. Code for the Motor Vehicle Retailing Trade, Art. IV (B) (6).
9. Of 719 desist orders issued by the Commission between 1915 and 1928 dealing with
single violations of nine of the most familiar accepted standards, 22 were sustained by the
Circuit Courts of Appeals and 2 by the Supreme Court, while only 17 were reversed. Of
the first 350 stipulations that the Commission was able to effect, 336 dealt with violations
of the same 9 standards. On the other hand, of only 97 orders issued during the same
period by which the Commission sought to impose nine new restrictions upon industry, 9
were sustained by the Circuit Courts of Appeals and 2 by the Supreme Court, while the
same courts reversed the Commission 26 times and 11 times respectively; stipulations were
secured by the Commission in only 7 cases involving these orders. Figures adapted from
NATIONAL IND-usTRIAL CoNlErENcE BoAaD, PuBLIc REGULATION OF Coi arTrTivn PRACTIcES
(Rev. ed. 1929) 278. For a similar tabulation see Handler, Jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission Over False Advertising (1931) 31 Cot.. L. REv. 527, 553. A complete review of
the court decisions may be found in McFARLArD, JUDICrA. CONTROL OF THE FEDERAL TRADE
CoMMSSION AND INTERSTATE CO 1MMCE CoMaxSSlOxN, 1920-1930 (1933) c. 3.
10. Administrative finality as here used refers to the willingness of the courts to come to
the same decision as that reached by a non-judicial tribunal.
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But the more important provisions found in most of the codes and in market-
ig agreements under the AAA are of a different nature. Indeed, one of the
essential purposes of the new legislation has been the effecting of a new type
of regulation of whole industries, contemplating the setting of new and more
social standards," and also, where necessary, the control of production and
prices. Thus the most striking provisions of the AAA marketing agreements
12
are those restricting and allocating production,' 3 requiring certificates of public
convenience and necessity before new ventures may be undertaken' 4 and fixing
prices.10 Similarly, virtually all the codes under the NRA regulate hours of
labor, prohibit child labor, and fix minimum wages; other provisions require
adherence to published lists of prices16 or fix mandatory prices;' 7 limit and
11. See Dickinson, The Major Issues Presented by the Industrial Recovery Act (1933)
33 COL. L. REV. 1095; Gulick, Some Economic Aspects of the NIRA (1933) 33 CoL. L. Rtv.
1103, 1116; Note (1933) 47 HAiRv. L. Rxv. 85, 108 et seq.
12. See Duane, Marketing Agreements Under the Agricultural Adjustment Act: Their
Contents and Constitutionality (1933) 82 U. oF PA. L. Rxv. 91.
13. The AAA hopes to control production of milk, by the fixing of prices for "basic" and
"surplus" production in such manner that surplus production may be discoufaged. See the
marketing agreements, for the enforcement of which licenses have also been issued, for
Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, the Twin Cities, Baltimore, Knoxville, Evansville, Des Moines,
Boston, San Diego, and Richmond. Marketing Agreement Series, Agreements Nos. 1, 3, 4,
5, 9, 13, 18, 19, 21, 31, 32; License Series, Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 13, 15, 24, 25. The
Marketing Agreement (No. 2) for California Cling Peaches, License No. 2, and the Agreement
(No. 6) for California Deciduous Tree Fruits, License No. 7, restrict total crop to be packed
to a definite figure and allocate the crop among canners and growers. The Marketing Agree-
ment (No. 12) for Pacific Walnuts, License No. 7 provides for limitation of supply to market
demand and for disposition of surplus. The Marketing Agreement (No. 11) for California
Tokay Grapes, License No. 9; Marketing Agreement (No. 26) for California Ripe Olive
Canning Industry, License No. 20; Marketing Agreement (No. 29) for Florida Citrus Fruits,
License No. 22; Marketing Agreement (No. 30) for California-Arizona Oranges and Grape-
fruit, License No. 23; and Marketing Agreement (No. 33) for Texas Oranges and Grapefruit,
License No. 26, provide for restrictions on shipment of all grades and varieties of fruit,
and allotment or proration of shippers' and growers' quotas. Similar provisions for control
of supply may be found in those marketing agreements unsupported by licenses. See, e. g.,
Marketing Agreements for the California Rice Industry (No. 10); for Disposal of North
Pacific Wheat Surplus (No. 14); and for Burley Tobacco (No. 34). See Dep't of Agric.
Releases, July 29, Aug. 1 and Sept. 14, 1933. The substantive provisions of the licenses thus
far issued are identical with the terms of the marketing agreements which they are designed
to enforce.
14. See, e. g., Marketing Agreement and License for the Philadelphia Milk Shed, Exhibit
B (2) (c); for the Boston Milk Shed, Exhibit D (A) (5); and for the Detroit Milk Shed,
Exhibit B (1) (c).
15. See, e. g., Marketing Agreements and Licenses for the Chicago Milk Shed, Exhibits
A, C; for California Cling Peaches, Art. II (6), 1I1; for Pacific Walnuts, Art. IV. The
Secretary of Agriculture has recently announced the abandonment of attempts to fit retail
prices of milk; henceforth, only prices to producers will be fixed, and a $200,000,000
processing tax will be utilized. U. S. News, Jan. 15, 1934, at 17.
16. See, e. g., Code for the Electric Manufacturing Industry, Art. X; Code for the
Retail Lumber and Building Supply Industry, Art. VIII (2); Code for the Salt Producing
Industry, Art. 4.
17. In condemning "selling below cost," some codes carefully define the term "cost."
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allocate production,'3 and require certificates of public convenience and necessity
for new production capacity or machinery; 19 regulate maximum terms of sale; 20
and prohibit such practices as sales below costs,
21 shipment on consignment,22
and guaranties against price decline.23  Regulations of this nature admittedly
deal with property and contract rights on a wholesale scale; instead of merely
enforcing pre-existing restrictions upon such rights, these codes and marketing
agreement provisions may be said to establish new restrictions and thereby
perhaps to constitute a "taking" of property. It was when the Federal Trade
Commission attempted in effect to create similar new standards for the guidance
of a whole industry that its cease and desist orders were subjected to rigid
judicial review.24 Thus the Supreme Court reversed an order of the Com-
mission directing one corporation to divest itself of control over another cor-
poration engaged in the same line of business, substituting its opinion for that
of the Commission as to the existence of competition between the two com-
panies and of an unlawful purpose in the acquisition of control.25  Similarly,
the Court differed with the Commission as to the "unfairness" of the use of
"tying" leases in the oil industry.
2 6
The Commission's determinations in cases such as these encountered par-
ticular difficulty in the nebulous distinction between law and fact.2 7  The
Federal Trade Commission Act 28 merely declares "unfair methods of competi-
tion" to be unlawful. With a no more definite statutory standard29 available
See Code for the Motor Vehicle Retailing Industry, Art. IV (B) (1) (invoice prices plus
specified expenses); Code for the Bituminous Coal Industry, Art. VI (1), (2) (marketing
agency to determine).
18. See, e. g., Code for the Lumber and Timber Products Industries, Art. VIII; Code
for the Petroleum Industry, Art. III, §§ 2 to 5. Compare the limitations on use of produc-
tive machinery. Code for the Coat and Suit Industry, Part I (3) (one shift); Code for the
Cotton Textile Industry, Art. III (two 40-hour shifts).
19. Code for the Ice Industry, Art. XI.
20. See, e. g., Code for the Iron and Steel Industry, Schedule G; Code for the Boot and
Shoe Industry, Art. VIII (3); Code for the Luggage and Fancy Leather Goods Industry,
Art. VI (12).
21. See, e. g., Code for the Iron and Steel Industry, Schedule E, § 5; Code for the Men's
Clothing Industry, Art. X; Code for the Shipbuilding Industry, Art. 7.
22. See, e. g., Code for the Hosiery Industry, Art. VIII (5) ; Code for the Retail Lumber
Products Industry, Art. VIII (11); Code for the Underwear Industry, Art. VI (3).
23. See, e. g., Code for the Ice Industry, Art. IX (2) (h) ; Code for the Iron and Steel
Industry, Schedule H (I); Code for the Textile Bag Industry, Art. VII (4).
24. See note 9, supra.
25. International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 280 U. S. 291 (1930); cf.
Federal Trade Commission v. Western Meat Co., 272 U. S. 554 (1926).
26. Federal Trade Commission v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U. S. 463 (1923); ef. Federal
Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421 (1920).
27. See DlcxmsoN, ADNsTrRATMnvE JUsTicF AND THE SUpRpmAcY OF LAW (1927) c. 8,
11; McFAR.Mmn, op. cit. supra note 9, at 25-29.
28. 38 STAT. 719 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 45 (1926).
29. An indefinite standard was enacted in order to insure flexibility and the possibility
of adaptation to new situations. See Handler, supra note 9, at 534.
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than this, the Commission's conclusion that a practice familiar throughout an
industry should be prohibited could only be enunciated in a finding upon the
facts of a particular case that the practice as carried on by the individual re-
spondent in that case was an "unfair method of competition." The Commission
thus could not distinguish in its findings between establishment of the standard
and application of it to the particular facts. Nor did the courts in reviewing
make such a distinction, but merely sought to determine for themselves whether
the facts of the case summed up to a conclusion that the respondent had en-
gaged in an unfair practice.30 The NRA codes and AAA marketing agree-
ments necessarily include many provisions similarly general in terminology.
An administrative finding3l that a respondent has disregarded a provision of this
character not only involves a determination from the evidence of what par-
ticular acts the respondent has done, but also requires the making of an inference
that those acts amount to a violation of the provision. In reviewing such a
finding the courts could readily hold the making of this inference to be a
matter of fact, of application of the general standards to the particular facts,
and so conclusive if supported by evidence. The experience of the Federal
Trade Commission unfortunately suggests, however, that the determination of
whether the respondent's admitted or demonstrated activities are within the
prohibition of the code may with equal facility be regarded by the courts as
a setting of standards and hence a matter of law to be reviewed by them.3 2
Enforcement of such general and indefinite provisions as are found in the
codes and marketing agreements will thus be peculiarly susceptible to judicial
review.
Many terms found in the codes and marketing agreements, however, are
sufficiently definite, and objective evidence may so directly prove or disprove
the existence of a violation, that determination of the legality of those terms
will present an issue separate and distinct from the finding that a particular
respondent's conduct is in violation thereof. For example, an administrative
order to the effect that the respondent, contrary to the code for his industry,
has employed child labor, or has operated more than the permitted number of
shifts, or has sold goods at less than the designated price, will present as the
principal questions for judicial review the constitutionality of the code provision
and its reasonableness as a method of effectuating the purposes and policies of
the statute. If these questions have been passed upon favorably, the administra-
tive finding upon the factual issue of the particular respondent's violation of the
code will be largely a matter of considering the credibility of witnesses and of
30. See, e. g., L. B. Silver Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 289 Fed. 98S, 990 (C. C. A.
6th, 1923); McFARLANm, op. cit. supra note 9, at 93, 96.
31. Although the Code Industrial Adjustment Agencies and the marketing agreement
committees are not statutory bodies, the courts will probably treat their findings substanti-
ally in the same fashion as they treat those of government officials enforcing the licensing
provisions.
32. See Dicmusox, op. cit. supra note 27, at 55, 312 et seq. The ease with which a
question of law may be found is illustrated by Frischer & Co. v. Bakelite Corp., 39 F. (2d)
247, 259 (Ct. Cust. & Pat. App. 1930).
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weighing conflicts in their evidence. Uncertain "inferences" will not be needed.
It would seem, therefore, that in these cases the difficult distinction between law
and fact will not provide the occasion for judicial review.
But even these more definite provisions of the codes and marketing agree-
ments may be subjected to judicial supervision notwithstanding their possible
avoidance of the law and fact distinction. For the concepts of "jurisdictional
fact" and "constitutional fact" will afford ample ground for almost unlimited
review8 3 if the courts adopt a hostile attitude toward the recovery statutes or
their administration. Precedent could readily be found for a decision that the
NRA and AAA authorize proceedings only when a respondent has engaged
in an unfair practice, and that therefore the existence of such a practice in any.
case is a "jurisdictional fact" which the court must consider independently of
the administrative findings. Thus in an early case where the Interstate Com-
merce Commission had ordered establishment of a through route under a
statute empowering it to do so only when no satisfactory through route existed,
the Supreme Court held that the existence of such a route was a jurisdictional
fact upon which the courts should reach an independent judgment.34 And in
Crowell v. Benson,35 the Court in reviewing an award made under the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act held that unless the respond-
ent was entitled to a trial de novo in court upon the "jurisdictional" or "funda-
mental" issues of locality of employment and master-servant relation, the
statute would be unconstitutional. Similarly, the mere allegation that en-
forcement of a code provision was "confiscatory" in the facts of a particular
case might be made the basis for judicial review of all of the administrative
findings.3 6 But application of these doctrines to the enforcement of the NRA
and AAA is only a possibility, not a necessity.37 The measure of finality ac-
33. Use of these doctrines will probably be confined largely to the review of revocation
and suspension of licenses. But see note 31, supra.
34. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 216 U. S. 538 (1910).
35. 285 U. S. 22 (1932), discussed in Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson: Judicial Review of
Administrative Determinations of Questions of "Constitutional Fact" (1932) 80 U. oF PA.
L. Rxv. 1055; Comment (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1037; Note (1933) 46 HARv. L. REv. 478.
36. The Supreme Court declared in Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253
U. S. 287, 289 (1920), that when a constitutional issue is raised a person is entitled to a
determination by a judicial tribunal "upon its own independent judgment as to both law
and facts." This rule, enunciated in a rate valuation case, has been followed in subsequent
cases of the same character. See Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public
Service Commission, 262 U. S. 679, "689 (1923). Although the Ben Avon ruling contemplates
a review upon the administrative record, a complainant affected by the decision of a state
commission could present additional evidence in the federal courts, providing he could gain
access thereto by raising a federal question. See Prendergast v. New York Telephone Co.,
262 U. S. 43, 50 (1923). The decision in Crowell v. Benson, supra note 35, extends this
rule to administrative bodies created by Congress, and allows a complete trial de novo, in
disregard of the administrative record. The question whether fresh evidence could be intro-
duced in court upon the issue of confiscation was left open in Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v.
United States, 280 U.-S. 420, 445 (1930).
37. The Ben Avon ruling is not always applied; it was ignored in Georgia Ry. & Power
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corded to findings under the more drastic regulations included in the code and
marketing agreements, whether those regulations are expressed in general or
in definite terms, will depend, first, upon the character of the administrative
proceedings which precede resort to the courts; 38 and second, upon the attitude
of the judiciary toward the purposes and policies of the acts.
It is the hope of the NRA that eventually each industry will itself secure
compliance with its own code. Working through their Code Authority, the
members of an industry will organize an Industrial Adjustment Agency and
subordinate divisional and regional Agencies.3" These Agencies will in turn
form a labor disputes committee, 40 a labor complaints committee, 41 and a trade
practices committee. Few industries are now prepared to deal with their own
labor problems ;42 for the present, therefore, these complaints will be handled
almost exclusively by the NRA's Regional Labor Boards.4 3  And even trade
practice complaints may be accepted by an Industrial Agency only when the
NRA has approved of the Agency's organization and has given it authority to
act.4 4 An approved Agency, upon accepting a complaint which it is authorized
to receive "in the first instance," 45 will give immediate notice to the respondent
of the allegation that he is violating the code. An interview with the respondent
in the office of the Agency may follow, supplemented if necessary by a field
adjuster's investigation; in any event the respondent will have a right to appear
in person before the Agency.40 Either the respondent or the Agency may then
call upon the higher Industrial Agencies in turn to adjust the complaint; if
this result is not reached the highest Agency, after giving notice to the respond-
ent, will send the case to the NRA's National Director of Compliance in Wash-
Co. v. Railroad Commission, 262 U. S. 625 (1923), decided the same day as the Bluefield
case, supra note 36. See also Matter of Helfrick v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 256 N. Y.
199, 206, 176 N. E. 141, 143 (1931). The decision in the Crowell case has not been extended
beyond the Longshoremen's Act, and has since been limited to its own facts by the lower
federal courts. See Comment (1934) 43 YA, L. J. 640, 645.
38. See DIc--soN, op. cit. supra note 27, at 106, n.; Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 Fed. 17,
47, 51 (D. Mass. 1920); Smith v. Foster, 15 F. (2d) 115, 117 (S. D. N. Y. 1926).
39. M ,NTAL FOR Tim ADJUSTmEmT oF Coa ,Lrau1xs (N. R. A. Bull. No. 7, Jan. 22, 1934)
at 4. The Code Authorities may in some instances themselves act as such an Agency. Ibid.
40. Dealing with situations in which a strike or lockout exists or is threatened. Id. at 5.
41. Dealing with alleged violations of the codes' labor provisions. Ibid. The two labor
committees may be combined, and certainly will be coordinatetl. Id. at 24, 25.
42. Id. at 5.
43. Id. at 12.
44. An agency will first be given authority to handle only particular types of complaints;
as its capacity becomes demonstrated, however, the scope of its powers will be correspond-
ingly increased.
45. As contrasted with authority to attempt adjustments of complaints referred to it
by the State Director. See note 51, infra.
46. Express notice of this right, and of his right to appeal to the higher Industrial Agencies
or directly to the NRA, will be given the respondent.
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ington, forwarding to that official a complete record47 of the proceedings.48
If the National Director cannot adjust the complaint, or if he deems further
efforts futile, he will refer the matter to the National Compliance Board. The
Board may itself attempt to adjust the dispute, or it may hold a public hearing
in Washington or locally, remove the respondent's Blue Eagle and give publicity
to that action, or recommend to the Administrator that the case be turned over
to the Federal Trade Commission or to the Department of Justice. The Trade
Commission will hold its own hearing upon cases put before it, and, if it con-
siders such action proper, will issue its customary cease and desist order. In
cases referred to the Department of Justice, the federal district attorneys will
either apply to the courts for an injunction or bring suit to enforce the penalties
provided by the statute.49
But the NRA does not plan to rely wholly upon industrial self-government.
It has therefore established its own adjustment machinery, paralleling that to be
created by the Code Authorities. Under the guidance of the National Com-
pliance Director, the National Emergency Council has appointed State Directors
to handle trade practice complaints until Industrial Adjustment Agencies are
formed and approved, and thereafter to act when an Industrial Agency proves
unwilling or unable to effect adjustments. A State Director may refer certain
types of complaints to the Industrial Agencies, 51 and may himself attempt to
adjust other disputes through a Compliance Officer and field adjusters. State
Adjustment Boards are to be formed, before which respondents will have a
right to appear in person; 52 but the Boards will have power only to recommend
to the Directors the action they think proper. The State Directors may them-
selves refer cases, or the respondents may appeal, to the National Compliance
Director; 53 thence, by way of the National Compliance Board and the Ad-
47. This record will include the complaint, all correspondence, all affidavits and evidence
taken, reports of the field adjusters, summaries of all oral and copies of all written state-
ments made by the respondent, and the recommendations of each of the Adjustment Agencies
that passed upon the case. MA.NUAL FOR THE ADJtUSTMNT OF CoAxLAMNTs, op. cit. supra
note 39, at 30.
48. "If at any time the highest Adjustment Agency is convinced that a complaint con-
clusively sets forth a violation which the respondent shows no disposition to correct or adjust
the case may be immediately referred to NRA without following the steps outlined above."
Id. at 31.
49. National Industrial Recovery Act, §§ 3 (c), 3 (f). The Federal Trade Commission
is given jurisdiction by § 3 (b).
50. MANuAL FOR THE ADyns=msrT or ComPLANTs, op. cit. supra note 39, at 5.
51. The Agencies will probably be authorized to handle many complaints "on reference"
before they are given power to take complaints "in the first instance." The local Agencies
will follow their customary procedure in dealing with complaints "on reference," but will
report back promptly, at least within two weeks, to the State Directors.
52. As with the Industrial Agencies, express notice of this right and of the right to appeal
to the National Director of Compliance will be given to the respondent.
53. A provision similar to that quoted in note 48, supra, will enable a State Director
to expedite the administrative proceedings in cases of particularly flagrant violations. Id.
at 17.
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ministrator, the cases will reach either the Federal Trade Commission or the
Department of Justice. Although the AAA has not worked out its procedure in
as elaborate detail, it is apparent that administrative investigations of alleged
violations of marketing agreements will be similar. Local committees will make
inquiries, conduct hearings, and report their conclusions to the Agricultural
Administration in Washington, 4 which may apply to the courts for enforce-
ment of the agreements. 5
If in practice the NRA Administrator seeks enforcement of the codes' more
substantial regulations of industries through the Federal Trade Commission,
the hearing before that body will presumably satisfy the requirement of a
procedure that is judicial in character; the Commission's inability to secure
finality for its findings in similar proceedings not arising under the NRA ap-
parently does not result from objection to the nature of those proceedings.58
But it hardly seems probable that the Administrator will frequently carry a
dispute to the Commission, since more expeditious enforcement will be available
through immediate court proceedings instigated by the district attorneys. For
this reason, and also because injunctions may cut short the administrative pro-
ceedings, 57 enforcement of the codes will ordinarily come before the courts pre-
ceded only by the attempts of the Industrial Agencies or of the State Directors,
and those of the national officials in Washington, to "adjust" complaints; simi-
larly, administrative disposition of violations pf marketing agreements will
consist only of informal investigations by the local committees. Such proceed-
ings appear to fall short of being judicial in character. 58 A private interview,
54. See e. g., Marketing Agreement for Philadelphia Milk Shed, § 11 (contemplates
"findings" by the Committee); Marketing Agreement for California Cling Peaches, Art. IX
(2), X; Marketing Agreement for Florida Citrus Fruits, Art. VIII (2) (b).
55. The Agricultural Adjustment Act, § 8 (2), contains no specific criminal penalty for
violation of marketing agreements. Enforcement of marketing agreements is apparently to
be accomplished solely by the use of the licensing provision, § 8 (3). Under the NRA the
codes themselves are binding upon all members of the industries concerned and are sup-
ported by criminal penalties. Since AAA marketing agreements are binding only upon
signatories thereto, and further, since they are not self-enforcing, the licensing provision
constitutes the only enforcing medium of the Act. It is possible, however, that in case of
single violations of a marketing agreement, where it would be undesirable to license all
producers and processors within the marketing area, the violation may be prevented by
application to the courts for an injunction. Ultimately, of course, utilization of the licensing
power must, like enforcement of the codes, be passed upon by the courts, whether by suit
to enforce the statutory penalties against one whose license has been revoked, or by applica-
tion for an injunction, either by the licensee of by the Administration.
56. However, the inadequacy of the opinions delivered by the Federal Trade Commission,
although not openly remarked by the courts, is thought to account partially for the frequency
with which the Commission's orders have been reversed. See McF Arzmm, op. cit. supra
note 9, at 178. But administrative tribunals need not observe the technical rules of evidence.
See Tagg Bros. & Moorehead v. United States, supra note 36, at 442.
57. Willamette Valley Lumber Co. v. Watzek, U. S. Law Week, Feb. 6, 1934, at 39; cf.
N. Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1934, at 42. (D. Ore. Jan. 24, 1924).
58. See authorities cited in note 38, supra.
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a field adjuster's trip to the respondent's plant, and the respondent's appearance
before an Agency or Board, may supply the only "evidence" available. No
verbatim record is kept; witnesses are apparently not put upon oath; and no
opportunity for cross-examination is afforded. 59 The proceedings at no point
involve an attempt to alter the respondent's personal or property rights by
application of legal compulsion. Indeed, the NRA expressly states that it seeks
only to "adjust," not to "enforce" the Codes. The federal district attorneys
thus will not seek judicial enforcement of an administrative adjudication; rather,
they will present the evidence collected by the local committees and ask of the
courts favorable decisions upon the merits. As at present outlined, therefore,
enforcement of the codes and marketing agreements will probably be largely
in the hands of the courts.
In the use of the licensing power, however, strong claims for administrative
finality will be made. Judicial interference with this power, relied upon as
the most effective device6 ° for compelling compliance with the recovery statutes,
would be most unfortunate. No licenses have as yet been issued under the
NRA. But regulations drawn up by the Secretary of Agriculture for the pro-
cedure in revoking an AAA license 6' show a careful regard for the requirement
that the proceedings be judicial in character. The regulations provide for the
issuance of an order to an alleged violator to show cause why his license should
not be suspended or revoked. The licensee must then file an answer. A hearing
is held, at which oral arguments may be presented and written briefs filed,
before a representative of the Administration. The latter official reports his
findings of fact to the Secretary of Agriculture, who may either dismiss the
charges or issue an order, accompanied by findings of fact, suspending or revok-
ing the license.62  It is difficult to see upon what ground the courts could
criticize these elaborate proceedings. Adequate notice is provided; the presence
of counsel and an opportunity to cross-examine are provided for; and the care-
ful provision for findings of fact not only by the officer presiding at the hearing
but also by the Secretary of Agriculture suggest that a record of the proceed-
ings will be made up. Nor can there be any question but that revocation of
the license amounts to a definite adjudication disposing of the licensee's property
59. The Marketing Agreement for Florida Citrus Fruits merely provides, Art. VflI, § 2
(b), that where an investigation of an alleged violation is undertaken, "The Committee may
require any Shipper to furnish a statement of the facts under oath, and may, in its
discretion, conduct such hearing as it may deem advisable."
60. Licenses are the only method provided for enforcement of the AAA. See note 55,
supr-.
61. AGRiCULTURAL ADjusmNTrrI ADmsinrTRATiON, GENRAL REGULATIONS, SEREs 3, as
revised and superseded by SEa"ms 4, REvisioN 1.
62. The Secretary is directed to reinstate the license upon a showing by the applicant of
ability and willingness "in good faith to comply with the conditions and terms of the
license," and in addition, where the violation was "willful or in bad faith" upon the posting
of a bond. The Secretary may modify a license on complaint by an aggrieved licensee, or on
his own motion, in each case after a hearing. Id., SEPIEs 3. Similarly elaborate procedure
is provided for issuance, amendment and modification of licenses. Id., Snuas 4, RlvisioN 1.
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rights. 3 Resort to the courts will be had to enforce or enjoin this administra-
tive adjudication, not to secure a judicial determination of the controversy.
64
It would seem, therefore, that a fair measure of finality may be anticipated for
the findings of fact upon which revocation of a license is based.65
Such a conclusion is subject to immediate qualification, however. For the
readiness with which the courts accept the social policies of the "New Deal"
will be of even greater significance in determining the extent of judicial review
than either the broadness of the regulations of industry or the judicial charac-
ter of the administrative proceedings.0 6 Thus, the courts' refusal to review
facts found by the Interstate Commerce Commission is in large part explained
by the fact that the policy of regulating common carriers has been traditional
in the common law, and has, moreover, been frequently reiterated by Congress
in amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act.6r A similar degree of judicial
self-restraint has been accorded the Federal Trade Commission when that body
has sought merely to deal with petty violations of the existing and familiarly
accepted common-law standards of unfair competition; but a decidedly more
hostile attitude was shown by the courts when that Commission claimed a more
novel and sweeping control over industry, especially in the absence of more
definite and frequently expressed Congressional policy.68 The almost unanimous
support in public opinion which the NRA and AAA now enjoy provides the
63. Such adjudication is, moreover, expressly authorized by statute as a determination by
one of the branches of government. This is in sharp contrast to the code Agencies and
Adjustment Boards and marketing agreement committees, whose determinations are at most
impliedly contemplated in the statutes.
64. Compare, however, the procedure under the Lever Act, 40 STAT. 276 (1917), by
§ 5 of which the government was empowered to license vital industries during the World
War. Enforcement was sought not by revocation of licenses but by criminal proceedings
to enforce other sections of the Act. United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81
(1921). But see Note (1933) 33 COL. L. REV. 1197, 1202.
65. Both statutes provide that an order by the executive suspending or revoking a license
"shall be final if in accordance with law." The quoted words are found also in the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, which received such harsh treatment
at the hands of the Supreme Court in Crowell v. Benson, supra note 35. However, determi-
nations under the Revenue Act of 1926, 44 STAT. 110 (1926), 26 U. S. C. § 1226 (1926),
which contained the same phrase, were accorded finality. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283
U. S. 589 (1931). Determinations are treated as conclusive when made by the Interstate
Commerce Commission, SmHmrAs, TBxE INTRmsTATrx ComercE ComrissioN (1931) 417
et seq.; by the Secretary of Agriculture under the Packers and Stockyards Act, Tagg Bros.
and Moorehead v. United States, supra note 36, at 444; and by commissioners acting under
the Prohibition Act, Ma-King Products Co. v. Blair, 271 U. S. 479 (1926), the Tariff Act
of 1922, Frischer & Co. v. Bakelite Corp., supra note 32 at 257, and the Federal Radio
Commission Act, Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289
U. S. 266, 286 (1933).
66. For the effects of policy in determining judicial treatment of the Interstate Commerce
Commission as contrasted with the Federal Trade Commission, see McFAzmAND, op. cit. supra
note 9, at 174, 175.
67. Id. at 183 et seq.
68. Id. at 181-183.
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strongest ground for anticipating freedom from undue court interference with
administration of the two Acts. Should this support waver, however, and even
if it does not, the magnitude of the social policy involved, and its effect upon
the interests of particular individuals, will in all probability impel the courts
to retain a controlling hand upon the course of the new legislation.60
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL
OF OIL PRODUCTION
AN injunction recently issued by a three-judge federal court restraining the
enforcement of orders issued under the authority of the Oil Code promises
to be the test of whether the federal government has the power to
regulate the production of oil.1 Since it is widely acknowledged that the
problems of the oil industry are peculiarly insoluble without governmental
assistance,2 this constitutional question must eventually be answered regardless
of the permanence of the N. R. A. The Oil Code3 strikes a determined
blow at waste, overproduction and competitive drilling, the major ills of the
oil industry. It provides that reasonable market demand for crude oil
shall be estimated and allocated among the various states by a federal
agency, subject to the approval of the President. Subdivisions of state
production quotas into pool, lease, and well quotas is left to state agencies,
unless they fail to act; but local curtailment orders are given the force of
federal law.4 Other clauses of the Code endeavor to compel saner development
69. Lack of adequate machinery on the part of the executive to exert a comprehensive
administration of the statutes will also affect the attitude of the courts. The Federal Trade
Commission's lack of facilities resulted in discrimination against those whom the Commission
was able to regulate, and the courts were consequently not too well disposed toward the
regulatory body. Likewise, the comparatively inferior personnel of the Trade Commission
was a factor in determining the extent of judicial control. If the recovery program is ad-
ministered by relatively obscure, inexpert officials, the courts will retain a strong check upon
their actions. See McFARLAND, op. cit. supra note 9, at 176.
1. This suit was brought by the Amazon Petroleum Corporation and a group of other
operators to enjoin state and federal agents from enforcing orders curtailing oil production
in East Texas. U. S. Law Week, Jan. 23, 1934, at 3. The court declared that the petitioners
were not "subject to the pains and penalties provided by the act for violation of . . . (the
Oil Code) because they are clearly not engaged in any transaction in or affecting interstate or
foreign commerce." N. Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1934, at 9. The Petroleum Administration Board
is reported to be preparing an immediate appeal to the Supreme Court. Ibid.
2. LOGAN, STaILIzATION OF THE PETROLEU r INDUSTRY (1930); Ford, Controlling Oil
Production (1932) 30 MIcH. L. Rav. 1170; Marshall and Meyers, Legal Planning of Petro-
leum Production (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 33; Stocking, Stabilization of the Oil Industry (1933)
23 A.m. EcoN. Rxv. (Supp.) 55.
3. A Code of Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry. PRENTXCE-HALL Fm. TRADE
& IND. SEav., par. 12,321.
4. Oil Code, supra note 3, art. 3, §§ 3, 4.
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of new fields by prohibiting the drilling of any wells in undeveloped pools except
in conformance with plans approved by the President. 5 The constitutional
validity of these provisions depends upon how far the operative radius of the
federal commerce power can be extended6 and how successfully judicial nul-
lification in the name of the Fifth Amendment can be avoided.7
The commerce power would undoubtedly embrace these or any other oil
regulations if the Supreme Court should see fit to hold that the movement of
oil from the petroliferous rock to the surface constitutes interstate commerce;
for Congress can exert plenary control over the physical movement of interstate
goods.8 The only prerequisite to the exertion of such control is that the evil
to be prevented be one which arises after and by reason of the entry of the
commodity into interstate trade.9 And since most of the evils known to the oil
industry do occur after the oil has begun its movement to the surface, the control
of oil production satisfies that prerequisite. Recognition by the courts of the
actual unity of the flow of petroleum and natural gas from reservoir to con-
sumer may, as will appear, prove of vital importance to successful regulation
of oil, for otherwise enforcement of the Oil Code may, in one or two situations,
encounter serious constitutional obstacles. Were it not for precedents, such
recognition would seem inevitable. Oil and gas are frequently, if not usually,
piped directly from the well into feeders for interstate pipe lines, so that there
is no change in form nor any cessation of movement from the time the minerals
leave the pores of the reservoir rock to the time when they cross state bound-
aries.10 And even where this is not so, production of oil is so closely articulated
5. Id. § 7. The Code itself forbids merely the transportation "in or affecting interstate
commerce" of oil or the products thereof produced in violation of this section; but orders
promulgated by Secretary Ickes, Dec. 20, 1933, directly prohibit drilling or production in
violation of the section. PRENTicE-AIbL FED. TRADE & Iwo. SERV., par. 12,355.9. Those
orders may be regarded as an integral part of the Code in view of the fact that both the
N. R. A. and the Code itself reserve to the President and his agents the power to alter the
provisions of the Code at any time. National Industrial Recovery Act, P. L. No. 67, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess., c. 90, tit. 1, §§ 2b, 10b (1933); Oil Code, supra note 3, art. 1, §§ 2, 4.
6. If Code provisions cannot be justified as an exercise of the commerce power, they
are probably unconstitutional, for Congress is said to have no general welfare power. Jacob-
son v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 (1905); Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20 (1922);
HADEx, FEDRAL REGuLAT oN or Oi. (1929) 42, 49; Hervey, Some Constitutional Aspects
of the N. I. R. A. (1933) 8 T m7. L. Q. 3, 6.
7. Even the commerce power must be exercised within the limits prescribed by the Fifth
Amendment. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312 (1893); Adair
v. United States, 208 U. S. 161 (1908).
8. The Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321 (1903); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U. S.
45 (1911); Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308 (1913); Clark Distilling Co. v. Western
Maryland Ry. Co., 242 U. S. 311 (1917).
9. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 271 (1918).
10. The absence of any change in form makes it possible to distinguish Utah Power Co.
v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165 (1932), in which the Court held that generation of electric power
was not interstate commerce because it was a process of converting kinetic energy into




with interstate transportation and distribution as to be essentially part of a
continuous commercial stream."1 The law, however, has not yet accepted this
view. Dicta abound to the effect that the production of oil is not interstate
commerce,' 2 and in Champlin Refining Company v. Corporation Commission'3
the Supreme Court upheld state orders curtailing oil production, on the express
ground that they were regulations of mining operations which were not a part of
interstate commerce. This decision, however, does not foreclose the question.
It is a well recognized principle of constitutional law that decisions upon the
problem of state power to regulate are not strictly relevant to the problem of
the proper sphere of federal control. 14  Moreover, stare decisis is not a mandate
of the Constitution.15 And there is particularly striking precedent for a de-
parture from previous decisions on the question of when a given commodity or
activity is within the stream of commerce between the states.
16
If the Supreme Court should be unwilling to regard oil production as an in-
tegral part of interstate commerce, the activities of oil producers can never-
theless, in most instances, be subjected to control; for the federal commerce
power extends to the regulation even of activities wholly outside the stream of
interstate trade, whenever such regulation is of some assistance in protecting
or fostering commerce between the states.' 7 But the very statement of this
rule contains a limitation dangerous to certain provisions of the Oil Code. The
necessary corollary is that if oil production is not itself interstate commerce,
regulations of oil production are valid only when they have a beneficial effect
upon the nation's trade. When such an effect can be shown, however, the rule
11. An enlightened comprehension of the essential unity of the flow of oil is evinced
by Adkins, J., in Victor v. Ickes (D. C. Sup. Ct. 1933), (1933) 32 Om & GAs J. No. 29,
at 13.
12. See Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U. S. 229, 255 (1911); Pennsylvania
v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 560 (1923).
13. 286 U. S. 210 (1932).
14. Minnesota v. Blasius, 54 Sup. Ct. 34 (1933); see Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v.
United States, 175 U. S. 211, 246 (1899); Comment (1933) 43 YALE L. J. 454, 463.
15. See the exhaustive list of overruled cases, compiled by Brandeis, J., dissenting in
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 407, n. 2 (1932).
16. Contrast Hopkins v. United States, 171 U. S. 578 (1898) with Swift & Co. v. United
States, 196 U. S. 375 (1905).
17. It is a mistake to assume "that the power of Congress is to be necessarily tested by
the intrinsic existence of commerce in the particular subject dealt with instead of by the
relation of that subject to commerce and its effect upon it." ". . . the power of Congress
to regulate . . . if it is to exist, must include the authority to deal with . . . a host of acts
which ... come within the power of Congress to regulate, although they are not interstate
commerce in and of themselves." United States v. Ferger, 250 U. S. 199, 203 (1919);
and cases cited notes 19, 20 and 22, infra. This follows from the general rule that Con-
gress may enact any law which is conducive to the more effective exercise of any of its
enumerated powers. United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 396 (U. S. 1805); McCulloch
v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 415 (U. S. 1819); Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 539 (U.
S. 1871); United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86 (1919); Baender v. Barnett, 255 U. S.
224 (1921). But cf. Linder v. United States, 268 U. S. 5 (1925).
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should be of unquestioned efficacy in sustaining the enforcement of the Code.
It should be especially applicable in cases involving the producing operations
of companies which, because they transport as well as produce oil, may be
regarded as instrumentalities of interstate commerce; for federal regulation of
those directly engaged in the business of facilitating the movement of inter-
state goods has always been favored by the Supreme Court,'8 even where the
regulation's effect on interstate commerce was by no means direct'9 and even
where the purely intrastate activities of such persons were the object of con-
trol.20  But the intrastate activities of oil producers who are in no sense in-
strumentalities of interstate commerce should likewise fall within the operation
of the rule. There is nothing in the Constitution which requires that Congress
should regulate or protect national trade only by means of laws operating upon
persons coming into direct physical or contractual contact with the stream of
interstate goods.2 ' And federal laws restraining the actions of persons neither
within the stream of commerce nor engaged in facilitating its movement have,
in fact, often been sustained
22
18. This favoritism probably results from the fact that the activities of such persons are
transactually or causationally proximate to the motion of interstate goods, for the Court
often allows itself to be influenced by such proximity. Hopkins v. United States, supra
note 16 (insufficient causational proximity); Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332 (1917) (suffi-
cient causational proximity); Illinois Central Rr. Co. v. McKendree, 203 U. S. 514 (1906)
(insufficient transactual proximity, semble); Atlantic Coast Line v. Riverside Mills, 219
U. S. 186, 203 (1911) (sufficient transactual proximity).
19. Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1 (1912); Chicago Board of Trade
v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1 (1923); Davis v. Farmers' Co-operative Co., 262 U. S. 312 (1923)
(regulation of railroad's tort liability to customers) ; Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. Co. v. United
States, 263 U. S. 456 (1924) (recapture of profits on interstate railroad's intrastate traffic).
But cf. United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Rr. Co., 282 U. S. 311 (1931). In
all of these cases the persons regulated were in close transactual proximity to the motion of
interstate goods.
20. Baltimore & Ohio Rr. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U. S. 612 (1911)
(hours of labor of workers engaged partly in intrastate commerce); Southern Ry. Co. v.
United States, 222 U. S. 20 (1911) (safety appliances on intrastate cars); Houston & Texas
Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342 (1914) (intrastate rates); Wilson v. New, supra
note 18 (wages of workers engaged partly in intrastate commerce); Dayton-Goose
Creek Ry. Co. v. United States, supra note 19.
21. Congress's power to regulate commerce is plenary and limited only by express con-
stitutional guarantees. See Gibbon v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 187 (U. S. 1824); Atlantic Coast
Line v. Riverside Mills, supra note 18, at 202; Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, supra
note 20, at 27; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (D. C. Tex. 1933), (1933) 32 OIL & GAS
J. No. 20, at 24.
22. United States v. Ferger, supra note 17 (punishment of forger of bill of lading: no
goods were shipped); Thornton v. United States, 271 U. S. 414 (1926) (compulsory dipping
of intrastate cattle) ; Carter v. United States, 38 F. (2d) 227 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930) (same),
cert. den., 281 U. S. 753 (1930); United States v. American Bond & Mortgage Co., 31 F.
(2d) 448 (D. C. Ill. 1929) (regulation of radio station incapable of sending intelligible
messages beyond the limits of the state), aff'd, 52 F. (2d) 318 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931); United
States v. Calistan Packers, 4 F. Supp. 660 (D. C. Cal. 1933); State of Texas v. Fifteen Oil
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In most cases the Code provisions for curtailment of production will be of
great assistance in preserving interstate commerce, since in, most cases they
will tend to eliminate waste and loss of oil, both underground 23 and on the
surface.2 4  Any such direct physical waste points to the premature depletion
of the supply of oil and the consequent future dwindling of interstate commerce
in petroleum and its products. The proration provisions in such cases, there-
fore, are clearly valid. But even where curtailment of production has no
Companies (D. C. Tex. 1933), (1933) 32 OI. & GAS J. No. 22, at 29; Panama Refining Co.
v. Ryan, supra note 21; Victor v. Ickes, supra note 11. Contra: United States v. E. C.
Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1 (1895); Illinois Central Rr. Co. v. McKendree, supra note 13; see
Newberry v. United States, 256 U. S. 232, 257 (1921). Hammer v. Dagenhart, supra note 9,
can be readily distinguished. Note (1933) 47 HARv. L. RzV. 89. Cases like Coe v. Errol,
116 U. S. 517 (1886), and Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1 (1888), are not adverse authori-
ties. The fact that a state may ordinarily regulate or tax intrastate activities without im-
pinging upon the federal commerce power does not mean that Congress cannot regulate
those same admittedly intrastate activities when the well-being of interstate commerce
demands it. Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137 (1902); Houston & Texas Ry. Co. v. United
States, supra note 20.
23. Ford, at 1171; Marshall and Meyers, at 35-37, both supra note 2. Petroleum in its
natural state is usually confined in the interstices of sloping sedimentary rock strata called
"sands." It is under pressure not only from the hydrostatic force of water at the bottom
or sides of the strata, hut also from the kinetic force of the natural gas dissolved in the
oil and from the force of the undissolved gas lying above it. MILER, FUNCTION or NATURAL
GAS IN THE PRODUCTION OF OIL (1929) 20. Unrestrained production of oil or gas causes
the gas pressure to drop too suddenly, with the result that the water beneath rises and
permeates the coarse grained portions of the strata so rapidly that the oil and gas content
of those portions is driven out and replaced by water before the water.has had time to
treat in similar fashion the oil and gas contained in the finer grained portions of the rock
layers. This latter oil and gas is thus surrounded by water and rendered permanently unre-
coverable, except by mining. A.nRos-, UNDERGROUND CONDITIONS IN On. FIE S (1921) 70-
78. Moreover, since gas pressure is one of the principal forces which drives oil from the rock
pores to the well shaft, disproportionate production of gas causes a greater proportion of the
oil to be left in the sands unrecovered when the pool energy finally gives out. MILLER, op. cit.
supra, at 44-48. Accordingly, the amount of gas per barrel of oil taken from any one well
is often limited. The required proportion is termed the gas-oil ratio. People v. Associated
Oil Co., 211 Cal. 93, 294 Pac. 717 (1930); TEx. ANN. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, Supp. 1933)
art. 6014 (a). Depletion of gas pressure decreases total recovery also by making the move-
ment of the oil through the rock interstices more sluggish; for both the surface tension and
the viscosity, i.e. the thickness, of the oil vary with the pressure of the gas dissolved in it.
MILLER, op. cit. supra, at 37-44, 202. The more rapid the rate of production, the greater
the loss of pool energy due to friction and Jamin effect, i.e., formation within the oil of
gas bubbles which resist distortion when passing through the rock pores. Id. at 206, 228.
24. The most important surface wastes are those which result from the inability of
marketing facilities to absorb promptly the full output of a field. Marshall and Meyers,
supra note 2, at 37. Such wastes include: the blowing of gas into the atmosphere after
it has been "stripped" of its gasoline content; the utilization of gas for the manufacture of
carbon black, whereby the energy content of the gas is not utilized; loss of stored oil due
to evaporation or fire; and loss of oil in earthen storage due to seepage or washout.
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tendency to eliminate direct physical wastes,25 nevertheless if proration orders
exert a favorable 'influence upon price, they should be held to be a proper ex-
ercise of Congress's authority over commerce. For low price causes such in-
direct physical wastes of oil and gas as the use of inefficient refining methods,
26
uneconomical utilization, and loss of oil or gas which would be extracted by
marginal wells abandoned because no longer remunerative.2 7  Price control by
means of production limitation falls within the scope of the commerce power
for the additional reason that it prevents loss of money through unproductive
capital outlay. Economic waste of this kind threatens the collapse of a large
part of an industry upon which the purchasing power of millions depends.
28
And the repercussions of that collapse would indubitably burden the nation's
commerce.
20
Where code proration provisions aid in the reduction of direct physical waste,
they will, moreover, be immune from attacks founded upon the Fifth Amend-
ment. The Supreme Court has on several occasions upheld state proration or-
ders as constitutionally permissible methods of conserving natural resources;
30
25. E.g., where the wells are already operating at such a small percentage of their
potential capacity that no sudden pressure drop with concomitant water encroachment is
to be feared, and where the gas-oil ratio employed is impeccably small. Of course, a fur-
ther reduction in the rate of production would probably tend slightly to diminish jamin
effect and friction, but de minimis non curat lex. Moreover, in older fields where the gas
pressure has been practically exhausted, even unrestricted production causes no underground
waste.
26. Improvement in refining methods from 1928 to 1929 saved 728,800 bbl. of crude
oil; yet the average recovery of gasoline from a barrel of crude oil in 1929 was only 24.8%.
100% recovery is possible but costly. WEsTcorr, Om, ITs CoNsxavATiox AND WASTE (4th
ed. 1930) 81, 135, 136. Quite obviously, the rapidity of improvement of refining technique
and the costliness of the methods used are closely correlated to the price of crude.
27. 500,000 such "stripper" wells are on the threshold of abandonment, in the belief
of the joint Stripper Well Conference of Kansas, Texas, and Oklahoma. SENATE HEARMGs
on S. 1712, H. R. 5755, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) at 177-178. Many of these areas, if aban-
doned, would never repay the cost of redrilling, unless prices should rise to fabulous levels;
and it is often more expensive to recondition abandoned wells than to drill new ones.
28. 20,000,000 persons, according to the estimate of Russell B. Brown, counsel for the
Independent Petroleum Association of America. SENATE HEA=Gs, op. cit. supra note 27,
at 175. A rise in the price of crude, even if accompanied by a coequal rise in other prices,
ameliorates the oil producer's economic condition; for his fixed costs, which remain con-
stant in terms of dollars, become relatively less of a burden, i.e. his debts can be paid off
in dollars more nearly equal in purchasing power to the dollars in which those debts were
contracted.
29. "When producing concerns fail . . . and communities dependent upon profitable
production are prostrated, the wells of commerce go dry." Hughes, J., in Appalachian
Coals v. United States, 288 U. S. 344, 372 (1933); Victor v. Ickes, supra note 11.
30. Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U. S. 8 (1931); Champlin Refining
Co. v. Corporation Commission, supra note 13; Peoples' Petroleum Producers v. Sterling,
60 F. (2d) 1041 (D. C. Tex. 1932); People v. Associated Oil Co., 212 Cal. 76, 297 Pac. 536
(1931); H. F. Wilcox Oil & Gas Co. v. State, 19 P. (2d) 347 (Okla. 1933); Ford, at 1197
et seq.; Marshall and Meyers, at 55 et seq., both supra note 2.
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and the Fifth Amendment imposes no greater restraint upon the exercise by
Congress of its enumerated powers than the Fourteenth Amendment imposes
upon the states in the exercise of their police power.31 But whether interpreta-
tions of due process permit of proration of production for the purpose of con-
trolling price as a means of diminishing indirect waste has not yet been judicial-
ly determined. Although at least four states have statutes sufficiently broad to
raise the question,32 there has been only one case in which a recognition of the
relation between price and waste would have altered the result, and there the
court ignored it.3 3 Logically, however, if the public interest in the conservation
of natural resources is sufficient to disarm the due process clause in the case of
direct waste, it should be equally so in the case of indirect waste.
Whether the Fifth Amendment forbids the use of proration for the purpose of
controlling price in cases where direct physical waste is not present and in-
direct physical waste is not recognized, depends upon whether the Supreme
Court follows the line of precedent which condemns price control of any kind
as being somehow different from other kinds of regulation the pecuniary con-
sequences of which are identical, 34 or follows the cases which recognize a public
interest in price.35 The portents afforded by litigation arising under state cur-
tailment laws are adverse. When the Champlin case36 came before the Court,
Mr. Justice Butler took great care to point out that the Oklahoma proration or-
ders there attacked had little, if any, effect upon price37 and that the portion
of the Oklahoma statute dealing with economic waste, if invalid, would not in-
validate the rest of the statute.38 His reluctance to declare a state free to
control price would appear to reflect a feeling that price control, even though
achieved indirectly through limitation of supply, constituted a deprivation of
private property without due process of law. Moreover, the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma, in an emphatic dictum in Sterling Refining Company v. Walker,39
has declared that a state has no power to prevent economic waste.
31. Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146 (1919); Highland v. Russell
Car & Snow Plow Co., 279 U. S. 253 (1929); United States v. American Bond & Mortgage
Co., supra note 22. '
32. Kan. Laws 1931, c. 226, §§ 1, 2; MIcH. Coikw. LAWs (1929) § 5697; OxA. STAT.
(1931) § 11567; T x. ANx. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) § 6014 (c, e).
33. MacMillan v. Railroad Commission, 51 F. (2d) 400 (D. C. Tex. 1931).
34. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. S. 522 (1923); Ribnik
v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350 (1928); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235 (1929);
Note (1933) 47 HARv. L. Rxv. 85, 91, and cases there cited.
35. Wilson v. New, supra note 18; Block v. Hirsch, 256 U. S. 135 (1921); Highland v.
Russell Car & Snow Plow Co., supra note 31; Note (1933) 47 HARv. L. REv. 85, 92.
36. Supra note 13.
37. Mr. justice Butler's conclusions as to the effect of proration on price would appear
to be economically and historically unsound. Marshall and Meyers, Legal Planning of
Petroleum Production: Two Years of Proration (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 702, at 729 et seq.;
Stocking, supra note 2, at 68.
38. The Court upheld the orders as a means of preventing surface and underground
waste. For a discussion of this case see Marshall and Meyers, supra note 37, at 714 et seq.
39. 25 P. (2d) 312, 321 (Okla. 1933).
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The same constitutional problems would arise if the Oil Code should be made
the instrument for bringing about the operation of each oil field as a unit under
a single mangement, to the end that wasteful and disorderly development of
new fields might be abolished.40 Clauses could be inserted in the Code brand-
ing as unfair competition any drilling or producing in new or semideveloped
fields except through the medium of specially organized cooperative corporations,
financial participation in which would be open on equal terms to all surface
owners and lessees; contributions of capital and distribution of the corporations'
income would be equated to engineering estimates of the oil and gas content
of each participant's acreage.41  This limitation on the way in which surface
owners might exercise their privilege of reducing oil and gas to possession would
be sustainable both under the commerce power and under the Fifth Amendment
as a means of preventing direct underground waste. Maximum oil recovery
is obtainable only by reintroducing into the oil bearing strata at strategic high
points all the natural gas which issues therefrom in company with the oil pro-
duced,42 and unit operation affords a practical means whereby such repressuring
can be accomplished.4 Unitization would also be valid as a means of facilitating
the enforcement of proration orders.44  But if neither of these grounds should
meet with favor in the courts, it will probably be difficult to uphold unit oper-
ation as a benefit to interstate commerce; the colossal savings in operating
expenses made possible by unitization4 5 would be more likely to be a detriment
than a benefit to national trade in the present phase of the business cycle.46
The power to compel unit operation, therefore, may possibly be forced to de-
40. The benefits of unit operation are discussed in MID-CONTMT OIL & GAS AssoCT-
Tioii, HANDBOO ON UNIATION or OmL PooLs (1930); Ford, at 1206; Marshall and
Meyers, at 59 et seq, both supra note 2; Merrill, Oil Stabilization and Due Process (1930)
3 So. CAra'. L. REv. 396.
41. By testing sample rock cores for porosity and for oil and gas content it is scientifi-
cally possible to determine with fair accuracy the amount of ol and gas which underlies
any given acreage. Oliver, Methods of Determining Relative Oil and Gas Content of Indi-
vidual Land Holdings in Common Pool (1931) 17 A. B. A. J. 541.
42. MILLER, op. cit. supra note 23, at 49-51.
43. The same result, to be sure, could be obtained without unitization. All operators
could be required to pipe their gas to a government repressuring plant'for reintroduction
into the strata through government drilled intake wells, the cost to be assessed against
the various operators at so much per barrel of oil produced. But the existence of this
less drastic alternative would not impair the constitutionality of compulsory unit operation,
for Congress ,enjoys wide discretion in its choice of the means employed in executing its
enumerated powers. United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U. S. 505, 571 (1898);
and cases supra note 17.
44. It would no longer be necessary to police each well. Marshall and MVfeyers, supra
note 37, at 742.
45. Total savings of $20,752,000 have been realized in development costs in seven unit
and near-unit pools. LoGAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 177.
46. Prevention of economic waste by economizing on man power and equipment would
merely transfer purchasing power from oil field workers and from equipment manufacturers
and their employees to investors in oil stocks and bonds.
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pend upon the Supreme Court's recognition of oil production as itself interstate
commerce, so that only benefit to the industry need be proved to satisfy the re-
quirement that the regulation be a reasonable exercise of the federal commerce
power.
The unitizing corporation could acquire the privilege of entering and drilling
upon lands of recalcitrant surface owners by being given the power to condemn
a horizontal right of way to the de'sired location and a vertical right of way
from there to the oil bearing rock. 47 For the federal power of eminent domain
can be delegated to both public utilities48 and private corporations, 49 so long
as the use is a public one; the fact that the corporations may make a profit
thereby does not destroy the public character of the use. 0 Nor is it necessary
that the general public share in the benefits; the advantages may be confined
to a particular district.51  Furthermore, the Supreme Court seems especially
willing to regard the development of natural resources as a purpose justifying
the use of eminent domain. 2  In any event, the courts would probably give
great weight to a declaration by Congress or its agents that the condemnation
of rights of way by unitizing corporations constituted a public use. 8  The oil
or gas itself would not have to be condemned, for according to the rule adopted
by the federal courts, surface proprietors have no title to the oil or gas beneath
47. An oil well is really nothing but a vertical pipe line. The condemnation of rights
of way for pipe lines is nothing new to the law. Aax. GEN. STAT. (Crawford & Moses,
Supp. 1927) §§ 3969, 3972(a); PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 15, §§ 2031, 2153.
48. Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry. Co., 135 U. S. 641 (1890); State of Mis-
souri v. Union Electric Light & Power Co., 42 F. (2d) 692 (D. C. Mo. 1930).
49. Clark v. Nash, 198 U. S. 361 (1905) (irrigation right of way for private farm);
Strickley v. Highland Boy Mining Co., 200 U. S. 527 (1906) (right of way for aerial bucket
line used by three private mining companies); Highland v. Russell Car & Snow Plow Co.,
supra note 31 (coal for private factory) ; Bassett v. Swenson, 51 Idaho 256, 5 P. (2d) 722
(1931) (power site for private farm). Three of these cases involved interpretations of
the Fourteenth Amendment, but they are precedent for cases arising under the Fifth Amend-
ment as well. See note 31, supra.
50. Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry. Co.; State of Missouri v. Union Electric
Light & Power Co., both supra note 48; Pittsburgh & West Virginia Gas Co. v. Cutright,
83 W. Va. 42, 97 S. E. 686 (1918).
51. "The inadequacy of use by the general public as a universal test is established."
Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240 U. S. 30,
32 (1916); Union Lime Co. v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 233 U. S. 211 (1914);
Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U. S. 700 (1923); Borden v. Trespalacios Rice &
Irrigation Co, 98 Tex. 494, 86 S. W. 11 (1905), aff'd, 204 U. S. 667 (1907); LEwIS, EaENrnv
DomAIn (3d ed. 1909) § 254.
52. Clark v. Nash; Strickley v. Highland Boy Mining Co., both supra note 49; Mt.
Vernon-Woodbury Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., supa note 51.
53. Cf. City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U. S. 439 (1930); Wilton v. St. Johns County,
98 Fla. 26, 123 So. 527 (1929); Consumers' Gas Trust Co. v. Harless, 131 Ind. 446, 29
N. E. 1062 (1892).
their premises.5 4 And where acts of Congress55 or provisions of the federal
Constitution5 6 are concerned, state rules of property must yield to federal.
The Oil Code, as it now stands, makes no attempt to substitute cooperative
drilling for drilling by private operators, but it does endeavor to secure all the
advantages of unit: operation by requiring that new pools be developed in con-
formance with plans approved by the government. 57 According to the announce-
ment of Secretary Ickes, no plan will be approved which does not provide for a
scheme of spacing and for a development tempo which will prevent underground
or surface waste or disruption of the price level.58 This should encounter no
constitutional obstacles. But Secretary Ickes has gone further and declared
that no plan will be approved "which does not adequately protect the cor-
relative rights of all the parties having an interest in the pool." 59 An attempt
is thus made to accomplish something which has no substantial connection with
the well-being of interstate trade. The adjustment of individual equities elim-
inates neither direct nor indirect waste. It exerts no influence on price. And
great difficulty would be encountered in adducing substantial evidence to show
that the equitable spreading of the field earnings among all the owners and
operators would render their total purchasing power more effective in stimul-
ating business activity. Accordingly, code penalties can in all probability not
be imposed upon violators of this requirement, unless the Supreme Court should
hold that oil in process of production is within the stream of interstate com-
merce.
Oil Code administrators will be faced with another situation in which a pos-
sible hiatus in federal power may develop because of the absence of relation
between the operation of the Code and the welfare of the nation's commerce.
The problem will arise when an attempt is made to enforce federal proration
orders against producing companies integrated with pipe line, refining, and
distributing concerns, by means of which they are able to market quantities
of oil or gas far in excess of their allotted production quotas without adding
a barrel of oil to storage or using a foot of gas wastefully. The wells of such
companies may already have been operating without causing any underground
54. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190 (1900); Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254
U. S. 300 (1920); see Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., supra note 12, at 253; SUM-
mms, Omr ANm GAS (1st ed. 1927) 96.
55. Brewer Oil Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 77 (1922); Chicago Board of Trade v.
Johnson, 264 U. S. 1 (1924); Strother v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 55 F. (2d)
626 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932).
56. Hanover Insurance Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S. 494 (1926); Louisville Gas Co. v.
Coleman, 277 U. S. 32 (1928). That federal courts are not bound by state property rules
when adjudicating cases involving provisions of the federal Constitution is further evi-
denced by the fact that in Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, supra note 54, the Supreme Court
expressly rejected the holding of the Indiana Supreme Court that oil and gas in situ is the
property of the state. State v. Ohio Oil Co., 150 Ind. 21, 49 N. E. 809 (1898).
57. See note 5, supra.
58. PPRmicE-HALL FED. TRPE & IuD. SEuv., par. 12,355.6.
59. Id. par. 12,355.4.
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waste. Morever, if there are other producers in the same field who have been
obliged to shut in their wells for lack of market outlet, the integrated com-
panies would supply their own market by buying from their marketless neigh-
bors any oil or gas which they themselves were forbidden to produce. The re-
sult would be merely a shift in production from the wells of the former to
those of the latter. And since the amount of oil or gas offered for sale would
remain precisely the same, price and indirect waste would be unaffected. It
cannot be successfully contended that because the per barrel operating expenses
of the integrated companies, if exempted from curtailment requirements,60
would be relatively lower than those of other producers, the integrated com-
panies could and would drive down the price of gasoline and lubricating oils.
There could be no motive for such price cutting inasmuch as the exempted com-
panies could not expand their sales of refined products without buying crude on
the market at prices which would make their under-cutting unprofitable-unless
they bought the requisite crude from their marketless neighbors, in which event
the authorities in charge of proration would correspondingly reduce the ex-
emption which the integrated companies had been enjoying by reason 'of the
proximity of marketless oil.
Where a shift in production from integrated company to marketless neighbors
would diminish the amount of oil wastefully stored or the amount of gas
wastefully utilized by those neighbors in their efforts to obtain some benefit
from their properties before the depletion of the common supply, curtailment of
the production of the integrated company would be sustainable as a preventive
of direct physical waste.61 But where wasteful storage or use is already ef-
fectively eliminated by state laws operating directly upon the wasters,62 no con-
servation of any sort would result from the enforcement of the Code. Federal
regulations in such a situation could not be justified on the ground that if some
producers were exempted, proration could not be forced upon the rest without
denying them equal protection of the law. There would be no denial of equal
protection, since the discrimination would be reasonably related to the foster-
ing of interstate commerce, the legitimate object of the regulations. 63 Nor
60. The amount of exemption allowed could be measured by the average barrelage run
in the preceding two or three years from the companies' wells in a particular field to their
refineries and by the size of the production quotas allotted to marketless operators in the
vicinity. Two or more integrated companies operating in the same field would, of course,
have to divide those unutilized quotas. Since production restrictions are calculated sep-
arately for each lease or well and are readjusted every month or oftener, the allowance of
exemptions would not unduly complicate proration administration.
61. Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, supra note 13; Danciger Oil
& Refining Co. v. Railroad Commission, 49 S. W. (2d) 837 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932). It is of
no avail to argue that this method of preventing surface waste is invalid because of the
existence of a more direct or less drastic method.fi See note 43, supra.
62. Laws of this sort have consistently been held constitutional. Walls v. Midland
Carbon Co., supra note 54 (prohibition of carbon black manufacture); F. C. Henderson,
Incorporated v. Railroad Commission, 56 F. (2d) 218 (D. C. Tex. 1932) (prohibiting of
discharge of stripped gas into the air).
63. Lindsley v. Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61 (1911); Second Employers' Liability
Cases, supra note 19.
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could proration of integrated companies be sustained as a means of equitably
apportioning the contents of the common pool, unless the apportionment could
be shown to benefit trade. Here, again, therefore, it will be necessary to the
consummation of oil regulation that the courts adopt the view that oil produc-
tion is itself within the stream of commerce, so that control of production may
be ipso facto sustainable as control of interstate trade.
But situations of this sort will only rarely be encountered. In most cases
it can be shown that the curtailment of the integrated company's production
will diminish underground waste,64 and as a rule the adequacy of state laws
for the prevention of surface waste is open to serious question. 5 Moreover, if
the integrated company has been accustomed to purchase oil or gas from all
who would offer it for sale at the company's price,6 or if it has ever acquired
land by eminent domain, or if its charter empowers it to engage in a general
transportation business, or if it has been selling by "private" contracts to
agencies which admit any one at all to membership, 67 it can be subjected to the
duties of a common carrier and compelled to take the oil and gas of other
producers pro rata with its own.6s This is true even where the particular pipe
line's preponderant use has been the transportation of oil or gas produced by
its owner.0 9 And even strictly private lines are constitutionally amenable to
such regulation if laid subsequently to the passage of a statute making all pipe
lines common carriers.7 0
In measure as the Oil Code meets with the disfavor of the Supreme Court,
the burden will have to be shouldered by the state governments. Their power
to curtail production in order to prevent direct surface or underground waste
64. Usually one need only place the burden of evidence upon the producer to show that
his unrestrained production will cause no underground waste. Danciger Oil & Refining
Co. v. Smith, 4 F. Supp. 236 (D. C. Tex. 1933). Moreover, where oil as well as gas is
involved, it is always possible for a court to find that any production by the neighbors of
marketless operators will cause underground waste; for maximum ultimate oil production
is obtainable only by simultaneous drainage from all parts of the pool, so that maximum
gas pressure and minimum viscosity may coincide with maximum saturation of the producing
sand. M LLER, op. cit. supra note 23, at 56, 57.
65. E.g., in Texas, stripping of natural gas is permitted to the extent of 25% of the
open flow of any well which has no market outlet. Tkx. Aix. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, Supp.
1933) §§ 6008, 6014 (e).
66. Pipe Line Cases, 234 U. S. 548 (1914).
67. Producers' Transportation Co. v. Railroad Commission, 251 U. S. 228 (1920).
68. Most oil producing states have already enacted statutes requiring ratable taking by
all pipe lines which have no vested right to remain free from regulation. ARx. GEN. STAT.
(Crawford & Moses, Supp. 1927) § 796 a 1, § 796 b 1; LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932)
§§ 4757, 4785; MicH. Comp. LAWS (1929) §§ 11635, 11655; OKLA. STAT. (1931) §§ 11520,
11553; Tax. ANN. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 6018, 6045.
69. Tap Line Cases, 234 U. S. 1 (1914).
70. Pierce Oil Corp. v. Phoenix Refining Co., 259 U. S. 125 (1922), involving Oxr.A.
STAT. (1931) §§ 11518, 11550. California and Michigan have similar statutes. CA. GEN.




is unquestioned, 71 and their power to do so for the purpose of controlling price
as a means of diminishing indirect waste should likewise be unchallengeable.
72
The states, moreover, possess a power which Congress lacks: they can adjust
conflicting private interests in a common pool.73 By virtue of that power, state
proration orders should be enforceable against integrated companies even though
neither direct nor indirect waste would thereby be eliminated. This could
have been regarded as firmly established in the law had it not been for the de-
cision in Canadian Oil Company v. Terrell,74 a case in which three integrated
companies, producing gas without waste from a field containing no oil, sought
an injunction against the Texas Railroad Commission to restrain the enforce-
ment of proration orders. The injunction was granted by the federal District
Court, which adopted a strained construction of the Texas proration statute7v to
avoid holding it unconstitutional as an authorization to the Commission to allo-
cate production without consideration of the question of waste.76 Those who ap-
prove of this decision can also call attention to the significant silence of the
Supreme Court on the same point when it was raised in the Champlin case.
7
Furthermore, it can be urged that the language of the Court in the leading
case of Ohio Oil Company v. Indiana,78 as well as in subsequent cases, 70 to
the effect that a state has power to legislate "for the purpose of protecting all
71. See cited cases note 30, supra.
72. See notes 26, 27, supra.
73. Ford, at 1188; Marshall and Meyers, at 51, both supra note 2.
74. 4 F. Supp. 222 (D. C. Tex. 1933).
75. TEx. AiqN. Crv. STAT. (Vernon, Supp. 1933) art. 6049d, § 4. This was plainly the
third attempt of the legislature and the railroad commission of Texas to provide an outlet
for marketless producers. The first was an order pursuant to Tzx. ANY. Civ. STAT. (Ver-
non, 1925) art. 6018, 6045, requiring pipe lines to take ratably from all producers in their
vicinity. Its enforcement against preexisting private pipe lines was declared unconstitutional
in Texoma Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission, 59 F. (2d) 750 (D. C. Tex. 1932).
The second attempt was an order requiring all wells in a designated area to be shut in until
other producers in that area obtained a market which would assure them ratable produc-
tion from the common pool. Enforcement of this order was restrained as unauthorized
by TEx. AN. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, Supp. 1933) art. 6014. Texoma Natural Gas Co. v.
Terrell, 2 F. Supp. 168 (D. C. Tex 1932).
76. The court held that the statute authorized equitable apportionment of production
from a common source of supply only when waste was being or was about to be committed.
As if to salve its conscience, it stated that the integrated companies were really not taking
any gas from their marketless neighbors, since the integrated companies had "not been
taking the proportion of gas which, under allotment, would have been their due." The
court is evidently oblivious of the value of a head start where the supply is llmited.
77. Supra note 13. The silence was made significant by the vehemence with which
the existence of the power was denied by plaintiff's counsel, id. at 213-214, and by Ken-
namer, J., dissenting in the court below. 51 F. (2d) 823, 831 et seq. (D. C. OkIa. 1931).
78. Supra note 54.
79. Lindsley v. Carbonic Gas Co., supra note 63; Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., sutpra
note 54; Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, supra note 30.
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the collective owners by securing a just distribution,"80 and the similar language
echoed by the lower courts, state and federal, 81 is inapplicable to a case of this
sort because the question of state regulation of wasteless extraction was not
presented to those courts.8 2  But this is unsound. In all of those cases the
rule was squarely laid down that a state has power to regulate the extraction
of oil for the purpose of protecting the interests of surface owners. That rule
is not to be regarded as dictum merely because it has usually been reenforced
with the proposition that a state may restrict oil production for the purpose of
conserving natural resources in the interest of the consuming public. 83 No
deviation in factual set-up should prevent the application of the former doc-
trine unless the deviation has a substantial relation to the purpose and policy
of the rule, thht is to say, to the safeguarding of surface proprietors. Since the
loss to surface owners is exactly the same regardless of whether a given quan-
tity of oil in the common pool is used or wasted, the existence or nonexistence
of waste is immaterial when state power is being used to umpire withdrawals
of oil from a common pool in the interest of surface owners. This view is
strengthened by the fact that production regulations have been upheld in sev-
eral cases in which, although waste was present, no mention of it was made
by the court.8 4 Thus, a state would seem able to compel integrated producers
80. See Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, supra note 54, at 210.
81. Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, supra note 77; People v. Asso-
ciated Oil Co.; H. F. Wilcox Oil & Gas Co. v. State, both supra note 30; Manufacturers'
Gas & Oil Co. v. Indiana Gas & Oil Co., 155 .Ind. 461, 57 N. E. 912 (1900); Russell v.
Walker, 15 P. (2d) 114 (Okla. 1932); Sterling Refining Co. v. Walker, supra note 39; Rail-
road Commission v. Bass, 10 S. W. (2d) 586 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
82. This is a view suggested by Marshall and Meyers, supra note 2, at 49; Note (1930)
17 VA. L. Rxv. 178; SENATE H1EA=cs, op. cit. supra note 27, 165-166.
83. When a decision is rested on two distinct grounds, neither is dictum, even though
either would have been sufficient by itself to have disposed of the case. Union Pacific
Rr. Co. . Mason City & Ft. Dodge Rr. Co., 199 U. S. 160 (1905); United States v. Title
Insurance & Trust Co., 265 U. S. 472 (1924); Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United
States, 275 U. S. 331 (1928); Alco-Zander v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 35 F. (2d)
203 (D. C. Pa. 1929).
84. Oxford Oil Co. v. Atlantic Oil Producing Co., 22 F. (2d) 597 (C. C. A. Sth, 1927),
cert. den., 277 U. S. 585 (1928); Marrs v. City of Oxford, 32 F. (2d) 134 (C. C. A. 8th,
1929) (spacing requirements), cert. den., 280 U. S. 573 (1929); Peterson v. Grayce Oil Co.,
37 S. W. (2d) 367 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) (vacuum pump enjoined). In all of these cases,
to be sure, the regulations did tend to prevent physical waste. Proper spacing is essential
to prevent loss of pool energy due to passing of gas. MrLxER, op. cit. supra note 23,
at 51-52. And the use of a vacuum pump not only increases the gas-oil ratio but also
encourages water intrusions. Id. at 120-124. But the fact that the decisions could have
been rested on waste prevention does not convert to dictum the ground actually relied
upon. Weedin v. Tayokichi Yamada, 4 F. (2d) 455 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925). Nor does the
fact that the Marrs decision was placed upon the additional ground that the regulations
in suit were necessary to avoid damage to life and surface property undermine the value
of that case as precedent for state adjustment of private rights. See note 83, supra.
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to shut in their wells completely until neighboring wells have been provided
with an outlet.8 5
The power of the state to enforce equitable apportionment of production
from common pools provides state legislatures with an additional legal tool
for compelling unit operation of oil fields.80 The return which each owner
would receive from the unitizing corporation would more closely approximate
the amount of oil and gas originally subjacent to his land than would the
amount which he would obtain by competitive drilling. As for the acquisition
of rights of way, the states may exercise and delegate the power of condemna-
tion as freely as the federal government; 87 in fact, some state constitutions
expressly sanction the use of eminent domain for the purpose of developing the
natural resources of the state.88 Finally, the oil or gas itself can with im-
punity be removed under the authority of state law, for, as pointed out above,
the federal courts have held that oil and gas in situ is not property within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 9 And it is unlikely that the due pro-
cess clause of any state constitution will be more conservatively interpreted
than the due process clauses of the Constitution of the United States.?0
The foregoing analysis of the validity of the Oil Code has been made in the
light of the conceptualistic dichotomy between intra- and interstate commerce
which has become imbedded in the law. It is recognized, however, that were
the Supreme Court to return to the interpretation of the commerce clause sug-
gested in Cooley v. Board of Wardens,9' the question of federal control of the
oil industry would require no such inquiries. In deciding that case the Court
85. Unless, of course, the shut down would by reason of peculiar well or field condi-
tions cause underground waste. Usually, however, it will not. MILLER, op. cit. supra
note 23, at 128-130.
86. German, Compulsory Unit Operation of Oil Pools (1931) 17 A. B. A. J. 393, 397.
87. Clark v. Nash; Strickley v. Highland Boy Mining Co., both supra note 49; Calor
Oil & Gas Co. v. Franzell, 128 Ky. 715, 109 S. W. 328 (1908) (this company sold no gas
to the ultimate consumer); and cases cited notes 51 and 53, supra.
88. E.g., CoLo. CONST. art. 16, § 7; Pine Martin Mining Co. v. Empire Zinc Co., 90
Colo. 529, 11 P. (2d) 221 (1932). IDAHo CoNsT. art. 1, § 14; Bassett V. Swenson, supra
note 49.
89. See cases cited note 54, supra.
90. State courts which have held that oil or gas in place is the property of the surface
owners for purposes of conveyance or taxation can without inconsistency follow the federal
rule where constitutional questions are involved. The fact that surface owners may possess
many rights, privileges, powers, and liabilities with respect to the oil and gas subjacent to
their premises does not necessarily mean that the aggregate of those jural relationships is
large enough to constitute property in the constitutional sense. SU3I-iEs, OM. & GAS,
§ 6. In at least one very important respect that aggregate is defident-a surface owner has
no right that others shall not deprive him of his oil or gas by underground drainage. Kel-
ley v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 317, 49 N. E. 399 (1897); Barnard v. Monongahela Natural
Gas Co., 216 Pa. 362, 65 AUt. 801 (1907); see Brown v. Spilman, 155 U. S. 665, 670 (1895);
ThoaNrOx, On ANfD GAS (5th ed. 1932) § 176.
91. 53 U. S. 299, 319-320 (1851). See Frankfurter and Freund, Interstate Commerce
(1932) 8 ENcyc. Soc. ScL 222.
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enunciated the rule that Congress may legislate over subjects of commerce which
are "in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan
of regulation"; while the states should be left free to govern where there is "a
superior fitness and propriety, not to say absolute necessity, of different sys-
tems of regulation." If this clear statement of the problem of political and
economic control in our federal system had not been supplanted by the con.
fused dialectic of more recent cases in point, there would to-day be no question
but that the federal commerce power would extend to every phase of the pro-
duction of oil.
LABOR INJUNCTIONS SINCE THE N. R. A.
CAvEATS ignored in the acclaim with which the N. R. A. was heralded as the
opening of a new era in labor law' are revived by the first group of injunction
cases to appear since the passage of the Act. Judicial interpretation of previous
remedial labor legislation as merely declaratory of existing law has been fre-
quent,2 and the recent business of equity courts seems to support the views of
those who maintain that Section 7a3 adds no new factor to privileges already
possessed by labor. In the federal courts by statute4 and in a few liberal
1. See Kmsr, TnE NATIONAL I DUsTRIAL REcovRY ACT (1933); TEAD AND METCALF,
LAsOR RELATIONS UNDER TnE REcovERY ACT (1933); Note (1933) 47 HARv. L. REv. 85,
122 n.; Note (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 1190.
2. The effect of Section 6 of the Clayton Act was restricted to conflicts permissible at
common law. American Steel Foundries Company v. Tri-City Central Trades Council,
257 U. S. 184 (1921). Its state analogues received a similar interpretation. Gevas v.
Greek Restaurant Workers' Club, 99 N. J. Eq. 770, 134 Atl. 309 (1926). State legislation
designed to permit peaceful picketing in situations not permitted by the common law has
been treated in the same manner. See Hellerstein, Picketing Legislation and the Courts
(1932) 10 N. CAR. L. REv. 159. For a general discussion of labor's experience with reme-
dial legislation, see BEanu, LABOR AND THE S:ERmAN ACT (1930), and W=m, THE
GOVERN]=T In LABOR DIspuTzs (1932).
3. Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 STAT. 198 (1933), 15 U. S. C.
Supp. VII § 707 (1933) provides:
(1) That employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from the interference, restraint
or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives
or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing or other mutual aid or protection;
(2) That no employee and no one seeking employment shall be required as a condition
of employment to join any company union or to refrain from joining, organizing or assist-
ing a labor organization of his own choosing.
4. Section 7a(1) is a restatement of the policy enunciated in the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. Su-p. VI § 102 (1932); cf. Wis. Laws 1931, c. 376; Section
2 of the Railway Labor Act of 1926, 44 STAT. 577 (1926), 45 U. S. C. SuPP. VI §§ 151-163
(1932); Pennsylvania Rr. v. United States Railway Labor Board, 261 U. S. 72 (1923);
Texas & New Orleans Rr. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & Steamship Clerks, 281 U. S. 548 (1930);
and the labor provisions in the railroad reorganization section of the 1933 bankruptcy amend-
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jurisdictions through interpretation,5 the invalidation of yellow dog contracts"
has already been achieved; and the abstract "right" to bargain collectively
through representatives of the employees' own choosing has long been con-
ceded by the most reactionary tribunals.7 But it is legal commonplace
that the strike, the picket and the boycott, the only weapons by which labor
can make effective its theoretical privileges, have often been outlawed
through the use of injunctions.8 The expectation that the statutory declara-
ments, P. L. No. 420, 72 Cong., 2d Sess. (1933) § 77. The Norris-La Guardia Act, of course,
operates to limit only the jurisdiction of the federal equity courts in labor cases; the Railway
Labor Act applies only to interstate railway employees; and the bankruptcy amendments are
similarly restricted. In Texas & New Orleans Rr. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & Steamship
Clerks, supra, the prohibition of interference with employee self-determination was held con-
stitutional. However, relying upon Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161 (1908); Coppage v.
Kansas, 236 U. S. 1 (1915); and In re Opinion of the Justices, 275 Mass. 580, 176 N. E. 649
(1931), the New Hampshire court, in an advisory opinion, recently declared invalid a statute
patterned after the Norris-La Guardia Act. In re Opinion of the Justices, 166 Atl. 640 (N. H.
1933). State legislation designed to protect workers from employer coercion has generally
failed to secure the approval of the courts. See cases cited in OAXES, THE LAw oF ORGA-
NZED LABOR AND INDUSTRIA. CONFLICTs (1927) 156-159; Wirrs, op. cit. supra note 2, at
221-230; see also statutes in FRAxxFuRTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INjuIcroN (1930) 146,
n. 52.
5. Exchange Bakery and Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130 (1927);
Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Green, 131 Misc. 682, 227 N. Y. Supp. 258 (Sup. Ct.
1928) ; Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, 247 N. Y. 65, 159 N. E. 863 (1928) ; La
France Electric Construction and Supply Co. v. International Brotherhood, 108 Ohio St.
61, 140 N. E. 899 (1923). Carey and Oliphant, Present Status of the Hitchman Case (1929)
29 CoL. L. REv. 441; Note (1928) 41 HARv. L. REv. 770.
6. For general discussions of yellow-dog contracts, see Cochrane, Attacking the "Yellow
Dog" in Labor Contracts (1925) 15 Aarx. LAB. LEG. REv. 151; Why Organized Labor is
Fighting "Yellow Dog" Contracts, id. at 227; Note (1928) 41 HARv. L. Rnv. 770.
7. See COMMONS, THE LABOR PROBLEM IN TH UNTED STATFS (1932) 313; CommoNS
AND ANDREWs, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION (3d ed. 1927) 112 et seq; FRANrIUma
AND GREEN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 29-30; Notes (1928) 42 HAIv. L. R rv. 108; (1932) 45
HARv. L. REv. 1226. See also Nelles, Commonwealth v. Hunt (1932) 32 COL. L. Rnv. 1128.
8. While the right to strike for a lawful purpose has long been conceded, American
Steel Foundries Company v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, supra note 2, strikes for
closed-union shops have been declared unlawful. W. A. Snow Iron Works Inc. v. Chadwick,
227 Mass. 382, 116 N. E. 801 (1917); Alco-Zander Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers
of America, 35 F. (2d) 203 (E. D. Pa. 1929). Reinstatement of a discharged employee is not
a "lawful purpose." Mechanics Foundry and Machine Co. v. Lynch, 236 Mass. 504, 128
N. E. 877 (1920). The attempt to secure the discharge of non-union employees is an
illegitimate object. Martin v. Francke, 227 Mass. 272, 116 N. E. 404 (1917). Strikes
which induce breach of contract between the employer and employee are illegal. Kraemer
Hosiery Co. v. American Federation of F. F. H. W., 305 Pa. 206, 157 Atl. 588 (1931);
Sarros v. Nouris, 15 Del. Ch. 391, 138 Atl. 607 (1927). This doctrine has been applied
where the remaining employees are free to leave at any time. Davis Machine Co. v.
Robinson, 41 Misc. 329, 84 N. Y. Supp. 837 (Sup. Ct. 1903). Sympathetic strikes have
also been declared "unjustified." Lehigh Structural Steel Co. v. Atlantic Works, 92 N. J.
Eq. 131, 111 Atl. 376 (1920); Blandford v. Duthie, 147 Md. 388, 128 At. 138 (1925);
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tion in Section 7a of a general policy in favor of collective bargaining would
induce a change of attitude9 in tribunals hitherto unreceptive to the needs of
Bricklayers', Masons' and Plasterers' International Union v. Seymour Ruff & Sons, Inc.,
160 Aid. 483, 154 Atl. 52 (1931). In addition, lawful strikes may be rendered illegal by
"coercive" or "intimidating" conduct of the strikers. The ease with which the courts find
these elements has been frequently remarked upon. See OAXES, op. cit. supra note 4, §
320, for an exhaustive review of these cases. Cf. Wood Mowing and Reaping Co. v. Toohey,
114 Misc. 185, 186 N. Y. Supp. 95 (Sup. Ct. 1921). Although peaceful picketing is for
the most part recognized as a legitimate means of persuasion, see Note (1933) 33 COL. L.
REv. 1188, all picketing has been declared illegal. Baldwin Lumber Co. v. Local 560 I. B.
T. C. S. & H. of America, 91 N. J. Eq. 240, 109 Atl. 147 (1920). Statutes and ordinances
imposing criminal penalties for picketing have been sustained. In re Williams, 158
Cal. 550, 111 Pac. 1035 (1910); cf. Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. v. Cruise, 189 Ala.
66, 66 So. 657 (1914); Thomas v. City of Indianapolis, 195 Ind. 440, 145 N. E. 550 (1924).
Picketing has also been prohibited except as a concomitant of a lawful strike. Gevas v.
Greek Restaurant Workers' Club, supra note 2; Heitkemper v. Central Labor Council, 99
Ore. 1, 192 Pac. 765 (1920). An attack from the rear on this method of enlarging union
membership has been made in cases holding that a strike justifying picketing must involve
more than one employee. Moreland Theatres Corp. v. Portland M. P. M. 0. P. Union, 140
Ore. 35, 12 P. (2d) 333 (1932); cf. Edelman, Berrie, Inc. v. Retail Grocery and Dairy
Clerks' Union, 119 Misc. 618, 198 N. Y. Supp. 17 (Sup. Ct. 1922), and decisions to the
effect that the strike is at an end when the striking employees have been replaced by
strike breakers. Quinlivan v. Dali-Overland Co. 274 Fed. 56 (C. C. A. 6th, 1921); Yates
Hotel Co. v. Meyers, 195 N. Y. Supp. 558 (Sup. Ct. 1922). A similar fate has overtaken
labor's attempt to gain its ends through inciting boycotts by third persons against its
antagonists; refusal to work on non-union material has been enjoined, Bedford Cut
Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Association, 274 U. S. 37 (1927); Note (1928)
52 A. L. R. 1144; and "unfair lists" have been outlawed as an illegitimate means of pres-
sure. Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911); Campbell v. Motion
Picture Machine Operators Union, 151 Minn. 220, 186 N. W. 781 (1922). See OAKES,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 598-740.
9. The ordinary procedure by which temporary injunctions in labor disputes are issued
allows free rein to the individual predilections of the judge. The complaints, answers and
affidavits forming the bases for ex parte decrees are stereotyped and palpably biased, giv-
ing the judge no opportunity to discover the actual facts involved. For reprints of some
recent complaints, see SENATE H-ARimGs ON Lnu rnG SCOPE or INju cTioNs n LABOR
DISPUTES (1928) 516-524; for illustrations of affidavits in labor cases, see FRANuxURTER
AND GREEN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 69-72. Although the result of a temporary injunction
is usually to break the strike, the employer is able to choose his judge, and restraining or-
ders are frequently issued by the judge signing at his home or club the draft submitted to
him by the complainant's attorney. See Wn=m, op. cit. supra note 2, at 88. The consistent
exercise of this uncontrolled discretion to labor's disadvantage has given rise to the "in-
junction judge", and the importance of the attitude of the trial court judge is indicated by
the interest which labor has taken in the election of particular candidates for the office.
See Wmr , op. cit. supra note 2, at 126-127. But even in deciding in banc the broad
question of whether the activities of a union are justified by the purpose to be achieved,
a diversity of individual opinion finds ample scope. The reports are replete with cases
where on the same printed record and on identical legal principles the majority and minority
reached opposed conclusions. See Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N. E. 1011 (1900),
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labor' ° has already been refuted by cases such as Bayonne Textile Corporation
v. American Federation of Silk Workers." Before the activities of the Federa-
tion began, none of the employees of the corporation were union members.
When several of the workers joined the union pickets and went out on strike,
the corporation applied for and received an injunction against picketing and
striking with a view to unionizing the plan. "Unionization," the court said, "is
not a lawful object of a strike ... the Federal Recovery Act does not warrant
interference by persons other than employees . . . by intermeddlers such as
organizers . . . Collective bargaining must be the result of mutual individual
action by both."
It is the lower state courts which pass on the bulk of industrial disputes'
2
and issue the temporary injunctions, seldom appealed, whereby strikes are
usually irreparably broken. The N. R. A. has been totally unsuccessful in im-
pelling these tribunals, traditionally unsympathetic to labor, even to follow
the policies enunciated by the superior courts of their states.13  The Amal-
and National Protective Association v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369 (1902), both
discussed in FRAN~rURTER AND GREENE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 25. "The ground of de-
cision really comes down to a proposition of policy . . . and suggests a doubt whether
judges with different economic sympathies might not decide such a case differently when
brought face to face with the issue." Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent (1894) 8 HAuv.
L. REv. 1. See also Scrutton, The Work of the Commercial Courts (1921) 1 CrAM. L. J.
6, for a discussion of the predispositions brought to the adjudication of labor controversies.
10. Note (1933) 47 Haav. L. Rxv. 85, 118 n.: "Possibly an indirect effect of the collective
bargaining provision will be a tendency to legitimate forms of group action previously held
illegal"; Note (1933) 33 CoL. L. REv. 1188, 1196: "Section 7 (a) will probably have its
greatest effect in changing the public policy of jurisdictions which have hitherto refused to
recognize unionization as a justification for strikes and picketing."
11. 114 N. J. Eq. 307, 168 Atl. 799 (1933).
12. Comment (1922) 32 YA.E L. J. 166:
"In labor cases the law which for practical purposes counts most is the law of the trial
judge, not that of the Supreme Court." It has been estimated that ex parte temporary
restraining orders have been issued in nearly one-half of all injunction cases. WriTE, op.
cit. supra note 2, at 90. According to studies made by FRANxFuRTER AND GREENE, op. cit.
supra note 4, at 79, of 188 reported federal cases between 1901 and 1928 in which temporary
injunctions were allowed, only thirty-two went to a final hearing; and of the total of
twenty-five temporary injunctions issued in New York City in the years 1923-1927 not
a single one was followed by a permanent injunction. See also Brissinden and Swayzee,
The Use of Labor Injunctions in the New York Needle Trades (1929) 44 POL. ScL. Q. 548
and (1930) 45 PoL. Scz. Q. 87. The failure to appeal from the decision of the lower courts
is due to the fact that the temporary injunction, even when issued only against unlawful
conduct, undermines the morale of the strikers, prejudices public opinion and diverts the
energies and funds of the union to the court proceedings at the most crucial moment, with
the result that the strike is broken. WrrE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 121. Moreover, should
the strike survive the issuance of a temporary injunction, the lack of provision for prompt
appeals results in any case in a review of the trial court's decision long after the issues are
dead. See Frankfurter and Greene's study of the delay before appeals are heard, op. cit.
supra note 4, Appendix II. Pending disposition of the appeal, injunctive orders appealed
from remain in force.
13. This contrast is most marked in the doctrines laid down by the lower and higher
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gamated Clothing Workers, claiming that an employer was violating the Code
in refusing to accord them recognition, picketed with signs accusing the em-
ployer of being "unfair to the N. R. A." Contrary to the "hands-off" doctrine
recently reiterated by the New York Court of Appeals, 14 an injunction was
granted 15 on the ground that such signs contained misrepresentations'0 since
the employer had not been judged a violator of the Code. Specialty Bakery
Owners of America v. Rose17 compares with the most retrogressive cases before
the Act.' 8 Here, workers striking after the expiration of a collective contract
were enjoined from continuing strike activities: "the mere walking back and
forth on a sidewalk with placards is sufficient to annoy the public and create
a public nuisance." While support for this view may be found in the reports,' 9
respectable authority is lacking for the practice, lately become prevalent, of
issuing blanket injunctions against union agitation for lawful purposes in in-
stances where the moving papers do not contain even allegations of violence.
20
courts in New York. While the Court of Appeals has adopted a consistent "hands-off"
policy [see (1932) 32 COL. L. R.v. 1248 and (1932) 46 HARv. L. REv. 125, 128], the lower
courts have applied some of the most stringent rules in issuing injunctions. See (1927) 40
HARv. L. REV. 896.
14. Exchange Bakery and Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, supra note 5; Nann v. Raimist,
255 N. Y. 307, 174 N. E. 690 (1931); Stillwell Theatre, Inc. v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 182
N. E. 63 (1932); J. H. & S. Theatres v. Fay, 260 N. Y. 315, 183 N. E. 509 (1932). Cf.
Roosevelt Amusement Corp. v. Empire State Motion Picture Operators' Union, 144 Misc.
644, 258 N. Y. Supp. 240 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
15. H. B. Rosenthal-Ettlinger Company v. Schlossberg, 149 Misc. 210, 266 N. Y. Supp.
762 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
16. In Nann v. Raimist, supra note 14, the court declined to enjoin the use of epithets
such as "unfair" and "scab" in labor controversies on the ground that the statements were
expressions of opinion, declaring, at 319: "The plaintiff does not prevail by showing that the
defendant's criticism is wrong . . . What is wrong must be so clearly wrong that only 'dis-
interested malevolence' or something close akin thereto can have supplied the motive power.
If less than this appears, a court of equity will stand aside."
17. N. Y. L. J., Aug. 30, 1933, at 707 (Sup. Ct.).
18. Following this case Governor Lehman ordered an investigation of the practice of
courts in issuing injunctions against labor unions. N. Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1933, at 7. Im-
mediately after the injunction was granted the plaintiff was found by mediators of the
Recovery Administration to have refused to cooperate in settling the dispute. N. Y. Herald
Tribune, Sept. 11, 1933, at 7.
19. Ellis v. journeymen Barbers' I. U. of America, 194 Iowa 1179, 191 N. W. 111
(1922) ; Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 17 N. E. 307 (1888). Contra: Empire Theatre Co.
v. Cloke, 53 Mont. 183, 163 Pac. 107 (1917).
20. In Nann v. Raimist, supra note 14, although the picketing had been accompanied by
mass demonstrations, rioting and assaults, the court recommended a limitation on the all-
inclusive prohibitions of the lower court's decree to picketing in the instant controversy
and to the use of definite coercion. On a later disposition of the case the lower court
allowed peaceful picketing. Aberon Bakery Co., Inc. v. Raimist, 141 Misc. 774, 254 N. Y.
Supp. 38 (Sup. Ct. 1931); (1932) 45 HARv. L. Rmv. 935. Requests for injunctions
wider in scope than the prohibition of illegal activity were refused in conflicting moving
papers and affidavits in Federal Slipper Co., Inc. v. Roth, N. Y. L. J., May 21, 1926,
at 18. See generally, (1930) 44 HARv. L. Rav. 971.
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This arbitrary procedure was repeated in the large group of injunctions2l
granted against the Shoe and Leather Workers' Industrial Union. And Elco
Manufacturing Company v. Shoe and Leather Workers' Industrial Union,22 the
memorandum opinion on which all these orders were based, also covered other
decrees issued at the same time on allegations of violence, threats and sabotage,
prohibiting for the first time in New York not only picketing and acts or
threats of violence but even the continuing of the strike.2 3 Precedent 24 as well
as the influence of the N. R. A. in favor of collective bargaining were similarly
ineffective in restraining the court in two other New York cases2 5 from issuing
temporary injunctions against the strikers despite admitted uncertainty as to
whether the employers or the workers had violated the arbitration agreement, 2
because "in the meantime a continuance of the strike will merely serve to
accentuate whatever bitterness there may now exist." An increased disposition
to remove obstacles in labor's path is also hardly discernible in Music Hall
Theatre v. Moving Picture Machine Operators' Local,2 7 where a theatre employ-
ing a non-union moving picture operator at a lower wage than the union scale
was held entitled to an injunction restraining the union (which was attempting
to oust a trade school masquerading as a bona fide labor organization) from
using tactics of annoyance, intimidation and coercion when picketing.28 And
the decision in Berry v. Old South Engraving Co.,2 9 holding a trade agreement
not binding on a new corporation though the directors, officers and stockholders
21. Sixteen injunctions were granted by Justice Steinbrink against the same union with
only a reference to the opinion in the Elco case. In thirteen of these cases there were no
allegations of threats, violence or sabotage. N. Y. L. J., Oct. 6, 1933 (Sup. Ct.). See
(1933) 2 INT. JuR. Ass'N BULL. No. 5.
22. N. Y. L. J., Oct. 6, 1933, at 1187 (Sup. Ct.).
23. See (1933) 2 INT. JuR. Ass'N Bu .No. 5.
24. It is settled that where the facts are in dispute a temporary injunction should be
refused. Morrin v. Structural Steel Board of Trade, 231 App. Div. 673, 243 N Y. Supp. 273
(1st Dep't 1931); Elk Street Market Corp. v. Rothenberg, 233 App. Div. 243, 251 N. Y.
Supp. 259 (4th Dep't 1931); Brighton Athletic Club v. McAdoo, 47 Misc. 432, 94 N. Y.
Supp. 391 (Sup. Ct. 1905); Cohen v. United Garment Workers of America, 35 Misc. 748,
72 N. Y. Supp. 341 (Sup. Ct. 1901).
25. Messing v. Hornreich; Pechter v. Same, both N. Y. L. J., July 7, 1933, at 70 (Sup.
Ct.).
26. It is interesting to note that the court said here that if the employers had broken
the contract no injunction should issue. Segenfeld v. Friedman, 117 Misc. 731, 193 N. Y.
Supp. 128 (Sup. Ct. 1922); Moran v. Lasette, 221 App. Div. 118, 223 N. Y. Supp. 283 (1st
Dep't 1927).
27. 61 S. W. (2d) 283 (Ky. 1933).
28. Cf. the attitude of the New York Court of Appeals toward disputes between rival
unions in Nann v. Raimist, supra note 14, where the court said, at 314:
"If the defendant believes in good faith that the policy pursued by the plaintiff .
is hostile to the interests of organized labor, and is likely, if not suppressed, to lower the
standards of living for workers in the trade, it has the privilege by the pressure of no-
toriety and persuasion to bring its own policy to triumph ... " See also Stillwell Theatre,
Inc. v. Kaplan, supra note 14.
29. 186 N. E. 601 (Mass. 1933).
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remained the same and business continued to be carried on as before under
the old lease and on the same premises, fails to evidence any unwonted solicitude
for safeguarding labor's gains in the bargaining process.
Nor are the interpretations which have already been made upon arnbiguous
portions of the Act calculated to diminish labor's well-known "phobia of the
courts." 30 The diligence with which courts have gone out of their way to de-
clare by way of dicta that the employer may hire and discharge on the basis
of merit, without showing cause other than union affiliations for his action,81
shows the anxiety of employers to insert 'the controversial "merit clause" in
their codes 32 to have been superogatory.33  Deliverances unfavorable to labor
and not required by the issues in controversy have also been made on the much
discussed questions of whether an employer is obliged under the N. R. A. to
recognize and deal with the representatives of his workers who are not also in




30. Rice, Collective Agreements in American Law (1931) 44 HAv. L. REv. 572; Note
(1933) 47 HARv. L. REv. 85, 123; Sayre, Labor and the Courts (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 682.
31. Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American Federation of Silk Workers, supra note 11; H. B.
Rosenthal-Ettlinger Co. v. Schlossberg, supra note 15.
32. See Code for the Automobile Industry, Art. VII; statements by Administrator
Johnson, N. Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1933, at 10; Labor Advisory Board, N. R. A. Official Release
No. 585, Aug. 31, 1933; N. Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1933, at 1, and N. R. A. Official Release No.
799, Sept. 13, 1933, forbidding the insertion of the provision in other codes for other in-
dustries.
33. The suggestion has been made that employers feared that while heretofore "a
union has generally been on the defensive in a court room" the Act would compel the
employer to justify his actions. The purpose of the "merit clause" was to reshift this
"extra-legal" burden on the theory that "it is psychologically valuable to have this right
on paper, in order to put a face on dismissals and forestall discussion." Note (1933) 47 HaRv.
L. REv. 85, 123. Organized labor has fought the "merit clause" on the ground that it
provides management a means of discharging active union members. This difficulty has
been obviated in industries in which unions have been strong by the establishment of a
joint board of company and union representatives to pass on the reasons for dismissal.
Employers have always resisted encroachments upon their right to discharge freely, re-
fusing to arbitrate the question until the strong intervention of unions. See ESTEY, THE
LABOR PROBLE (1928) 230. In the reported decisions of cases before union-employer
arbitration boards the question of discharge occurs more frequently than any other.
See summary of cases for 1924 in the clothing trades contained in the supplement to the
AEALOAffATED CLOTHING WORRERS HISTORY AND CONVENTION (1924) cited in Phillips, The
Function of Arbitration in the Settlement of Industrial Disputes (1933) 33 COL. L. REv.
1366, 1369.
34. H. B. Rosenthal-Ettlinger Co. v. Schlossberg, supra note 15; Bayonne Textile Co. v.
American Federation of Silk Workers, supra note 11.
35. Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American Federation of Silk Workers, supra note 11. Un-
certainty whether collective bargaining under Section 7a might exclude plant organizations
was expressed by manufacturers in the hearings on the N. R. A. and an attempt was made
to insert an express provision permitting bargaining with individual employees or company
unions. See HEABINGS BEFORE TEM CominTTEE ON FNANCE ON S. 1712, 73d Cong. 1st Sess.
(1933), at 31, 379, 390. By settled usage "collective bargaining" refers to union organiza-
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More serious than the eventuality that the Act as interpreted by the courts
may represent no improvement in labor's status is the possibility that it may
prove instrumental in depriving labor of hard won gains. Both the closed shop
and the right to settle disputes between rival unions without interference from
the courts are of central importance to labor. Only if trade agreements are
enforced can unions enjoy the fruits of organization and only if rival unions
are left free to settle disputes on the picket line can the attainment of bona
fide representative associations be assured. Such a policy on the part of the
courts might indeed be open to the objection that the employer, "caught between
the cross fire of two unions" yet unable to yield to either, might be destroyed;
but this may be an inevitable concomitant of the N. R. A.'s professed
policy of permitting labor to attempt to better its condition through unioniza-
tion. In Fryns v. Fair Lawn Fur Dressing Company,36 the collective bargain-
ing provision of the N. R. A. itself furnished the rationale for a reversal of
the recently increasing tendency of the courts to enforce trade agreements
37
and to adopt a laissez-faire policy in disputes between rival unions.38 In that
case the defendant signed a collective agreement with the American Federation
of Labor local while its employees were striking under the leadership of another
union. The order enjoining the employer from making membership in the
Federation organization a condition of employment proceeded upon the theory
that any dosed shop contract is illegal in that it violates the President's re-
employment agreement by depriving employees of the right of free choice of
representatives.39 The immediate result of the holding, it is true, was to pre-
tions. See HoxiE, TRADE UNioNism IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1923) 270; ColMoNs AND
ANDREWS, op. cit. supra note 7, at 128; TEAn AND MzrcALr, op. cit. supra note 1, at 123;
WBB, INDUSTRiAL DzarocRArc (1920) 222.
36. 114 N. J. Eq. 462, 168 At. 862 (1933).
37. See Fuchs, Collective Labor Agreements in Anerican Law (1925) 10 ST. Louis L.
Rxv. 1; Comment (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1221; Note (1931) 31 COL. L. R v. 1156; (1930)
15 MNN. L. Rv. 251.
38. In Stillwell Theatre, Inc. v. Kaplan, supra note 14, the question of inducing breach
of a collective labor agreement was squarely presented. Reaffirming the policy of non-
interference where "economic rather than legal issues are involved," developed in Nann v.
Raimist, supra note 14 and Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, supra note 5, the
court held that the bona fide attempts to advance labor's cause are not enjoinable merely
on the ground that the employer has a contract with a rival union. At the same time,
this court has consistently enjoined breach by an employer of collective labor agreements.
Schlesinger v. Quinto, 201 App. Div. 487, 194 N. Y. Supp. 401 (1st Dep't 1922); Goldman
v. Cohen, 222 App. Div. 631, 227 N. Y. Supp. 311 (1st Dep't 1928); Ribner v. Racso
Butter & Egg Co., 135 Misc. 616, 238 N. Y. Supp. 132 (Sup. Ct. 1929); (1932) 46 HARv. L.
REv. 132.
39. That outlawing the closed shop was not contemplated by the drafters of the N. R. A.
is evident from the fact that the original provision in the bill making it illegal to coerce
employees to join "any" organization as a condition of employment was changed to "com-
pany union." See S. 1712, H. R. 5664, May 15, 1933, and HEms BEFORE THE COMMITTEE
ON WAYS AND MEANS ON H. R. 5664, 73d CONG., 1st SEss. (1933), at 116, 118. The Act
contains no restriction against requiring as a condition of employment that the employees
join an "outside" labor organization, and it may be inferred that in declaring a policy
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vent evasion of Section 7a by the use of a company union disguised as a bona
fide outside organization, 40 but the doctrine that the closed union shop is out-
lawed 4' nullifies a primary objective of labor's efforts.
42
Even more fundamental is the hazard that the N. R. A. will justify further
limitation on the already drastically curtailed right to strike. Unless labor
is permitted this means of building an organization of its own and combatting
the manifold economic weapons of the employer, there can be no equality in
the bargaining process. Yet, almost immediately after the decision in La Mode
Garment Company v. International Ladies Garment Workers' Union,4 3 where
a code-violator was not allowed into equity because he did not have clean
favorable to collective bargaining it was not intended to make illegitimate its principal aim.
40. This device has frequently been used as an excuse for restraining activities which
were not open to attack on any other ground. Cf. note 27, supra. In United Bakers
Workers Union v. Messing, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 19, 1926 (Sup. Ct.), the Special Term refused
to grant an injunction on the ground that the plaintiff union was merely an unorganized
group of "scab" or non-union workers preying on organized labor. Cf. Interborough Rapid
Transit Co. v. Green, supra note 5, where the court, after examining the structure of the
company organization decided that it could not be adequately representative of the em-
ployees. The injunction granted in Brotherhood of Edison Employees v. Association of
Employees of New York Edison Co., N. Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1933, was issued to restrain
the management from organizing a company union on the ground that its purpose was to
interfere with the organizing activities of the independent union. See DurNo, CoMPANYr
UNIoNes (1927) for a general discussion of the problem.
41. The Administration appears lately to have taken the position that collective agree-
ments for the closed shop are contrary to the N. R. A. See generally (1933) 2 IrT. Joa.
Ass'Ix BULL. Nos. 3, 4, 5. General Johnson in his Labor Day address said: "If an em-
ployer should make a contract with a particular organization to employ only members of
that organization, especially if that organization did not have 100% membership among
his employees, that would in effect be a contract to interfere with his workers' freedom
of choice of their representatives or with their right to bargain individually and would
amount to employer coercion on these matters which is contrary to the law." N. Y. Times,
Sept. 5, 1933, at 2. In Article V (6) of the Coal Code the interpretation of Section 7a made
by the Administration specifically outlawing the use of the terms "open" and "closed"
shop [see statement of General Johnson and Mr. Richberg in N. Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1933)
was incorporated by reference, thus permitting employers to make individual agreements
with those who choose to act individually.
42. See COMMONS AND AnDREwS, op. cit. supra note 7, at 98; PERLum, A THEoRY
OF THE AmECA LABOR MOvaErUTZ (1928); STOCEToN, THE CLOSED SHOP IN AMECAN
TRADE UNIoNs (1911).
43. Gen. No. B-272112 (Ill. C. C. Cook County, Aug. 16, 1933), discussed in (1933)
33 COL. L. REv. 1264. Cf. J. & S. Cousins Co. v. Shoe & Leather Workers' Industrial
Union, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 29, 1933 (Sup. Ct.), where the union's defence was that the em-
ployer was not entitled to an injunction since by violating the N. R. A. he was not in
court with clean hands. The court said: "The defense is wholly insufficient as a matter
of law. Assuming that the allegations of the defence are true the alleged violation of said
Act and said blanket agreement are not a justification of the alleged conspiracy by the
defendant to ruin plaintiff's business." Cf. also Staley v. Peabody Coal Co., U. S. Law
Week, Jan. 23, 1934, at 9 (S. D. Ill.).
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hands, the argument appeared, forming the basis of several injunctions,44 that
a strike against a plant which is living up to the Code is unlawful as an imped-
iment to the success of the N. R. A. program. That the vigorous repudiation
of this position in two recent New York cases 45 has been relegated to the back-
ground by the view, sanctioned by administrative interpretations of the Act,
that labor disputes are to be settled by arbitration rather than by the economic
pressure of strikes, picketing or boycotts,46 is indicated in several recent de-
cisions. The order in the Bayonne case47 was supported by the argument that
"the Federal Recovery Act manifests a public policy to abolish strikes
by providing a forum for mediation of grievances." Four injunctions 4s follow-
ing this case were granted on the basis of complaints the theory of which was
that there is no right to strike until administrative remedies under the N. R. A.
have been exhausted. The same attitude appears in decrees made in cases,
ostensibly favorable to the employees, which illustrate the advantages labor
is to derive in compensation for the loss or limitation of its principal economic
weapons. In one New York case49 an employer who had refused to arbitrate
44. See Brooklyn Daily Eagle, Aug. 12, 1933, for arguments in application for an in-
junction against the Needle Trade Workers' Industrial Union. Six injunctions were grant-
ed against the Shoe and Leather Workers' Industrial Union, N. Y. L. J., Sept. 12, 1933, at
825 (Sup. Ct.), and two more were issued against the same union on Sept. 16, N. Y. L. J.,
Sept. 16, 1933, at 878. See generally (1933) 2 IT. JuR. Ass'x. BuLL. Nos. 2, 3, 4.
45. Robbins v. Altenberg, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 9, 1933, at 1690 (Sup. Ct.). The court here
said that compliance with the N. R. A. code even beyond the minimum there provided does
not make the call of a strike illegal per se. In Buckingham Cafeteria Company v. Mesevitch,
N. Y. L. J., Sept. 22, 1933, at 962 (Sup. Ct.) an injunction was requested against union
picketing for a closed shop on the ground that the fact that the employer was operating under
a code made the activity illegal. The court declared: "I find no reason for construing the
N. R. A. as being designed to upset the present law that bona fide labor unions have the
right peaceably to agitate for a closed shop." See also Kings County Haberdashery Asso-
ciation v. Retail Hat and Furnishings Salesmen's Union, U. S. Law Week, Jan. 23, 1934, at
9. (N. Y. Sup. Ct.).
46. The preamble to the N. R. A. postulates a partnership between capital and labor,
supra note 3. Thus, General Johnson has referred to strikes as "economic sabotage" [N. Y.
Times, Oct. 11, 1933, at 12]; and Richberg has declared, "This is no time for industrial
strife." N. R. A. Official Release No. 625. Senator Wagner has said: "Any group which
indulges in strikes or lockouts without first invoking the intervention of the National
Labor Board violates every dictate of good policy . . .' N. Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1933, at 8.
47. Supra note 11.
48. Only a single picket and no violence were alluded to in the complaint in Caldes
Restaurant Co. v. National Hotel and Restaurant Employees Organization Local No. 1;
Lichtman and Sons v. Shoe and Leather Workers' Industrial Union; Eskind and Sons Inc.
and Miles Shoe Store Inc. v. Retail Workers International Protective Association Local
908; Amco Inc. v. International Shoe and Leather Workers' Union. The court said that
where the strikers did not appeal first to the N. R. A. they "are acting unreasonably and
unpatriotically, if not indeed unlawfully." Newark Even. News, Nov. 21, 1933; discussed
in (1933) 2 INT. JuR. Ass'N. BULL. No. 5. Cf. also Staley v. Peabody Coal Co., supra note
43.
49. Durable Sportswear Company v. Hllman, N. Y. L. J., Sept. 13, 1933, at 8 (Sup.
Ct.).
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when the union was willing was denied an injunction; a Wisconsin court has
heldr0 that under Section 7a an employer is under a duty not only to recognize
but to bargain with representatives chosen by his employees; the order in the
Fryns case l restrained the company from refusing to bargain collectively with
its employees' representatives; in the La Mode caseP2 it was decreed that there
were to be no strikes or lockouts for a year and that disputes were to be
submitted to an arbitration board whose awards were to be binding. Similarly,
in denying the Progressive Miners of America an injunction53 to prevent further
discrimination by seven Illinois Ccal Companies which employ only members
of the United line Workers, the court referred the plaintiffs to the concilia-
tion machinery provided for in the bituminous coal code, proceedings which
culminate in compulsory arbitration.5
4
The marked tendency of the courts to look to arbitration reduces the question
of labor's net gains under the N. R. A., in so far as they can be determined at
this date, to an evaluation of the comparative efficacy of economic coercion
and arbitration5 as a mode of settling industrial disputes. A test of the con-
tribution of the National Labor Board by its success in attaining the main ob-
jectives in labor's industrial program"6 seems to justify labor's long standing
suspicion of promised benefits not won in the economic arena.57 The legal
50. Wisconsin State Federation of Labor v. Simplex Shoe Company (Wis. C. C., Oct.
13, 1933).
51. Supra note 36.
52. Supra note 43.
53. See account in (1933) 77 NEw REPuBLic 120.
54. Article VII, § 5 (b) and (c). "Any such controversy . . . shall be referred
to the appropriate bituminous coal labor board as hereinafter provided .. . . and the
decision of said board shall be accepted by the parties to the controversy as effective for
a provisional period of not longer than six months, to be fixed by the board. . . During
the consideration of any such controversy either by the agreed machinery of adjustment
or by the bituminous coal labor board neither party to the controversy shall change the
conditions out of which the controversy arose or utilize any coercive or retaliatory meas-
ures to compel the other party to accede to its demands."
55. See generally, List of References on Industrial Arbitration prepared by the DivisiON
OF BILIORAPrz or THE LiBRARY or CONGRESS; CoA oNS AN'D ANDREWS Op. Cit. supra
note 7, at 147-161.
56. Effective collective bargaining requires extensive unionization of unorganized work-
ers by independent associations, recognition of the unions by employers and the consum-
mation of legally enforceable trade agreements. The type of collective agreement desired
contains not only favorable terms on wages, hours and working conditions but provides
machinery whereby the union can take part in management. See BLUM, LABOR EcoNoMICS
(1925), for description of such trade agreements.
57. The difference between the terms originally accepted by the Administration and
the demands gained by strikes in the instances of the New York Garment Workers, the
Dress and Embroidery Workers, and the coal miners unions, indicates that labor may be
unable to procure favorable terms unless a strike is in progress or is threatened. See N. Y.
Times, Aug. 21, 1933; Sept. 9, 1933; Oct. 13, 1933; see also Fitch, Government Coercion
in Labor Disputes (1920) 90 ANN. Am. AcAo. OF POL. & SOC. ScL. 74.
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validity of the aid to unionization 5 afforded by the Board's stock method of
settling disputes concerning bona fide representatives-government supervision
of an election5 9-has yet to be determined by the outcome of the Weirton case.c
58. The prohibition of independent action by labor organizations to achieve unioniza-
tion (see statement of General Johnson in N. Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1933: "if unionization
is the motive behind the strikes it appears that advantage is being taken of the N. R. A.")
suggests that the Administration is acting under a program similar to that formulated by
the National War Labor Board during the late war. See BIrG, WAR T= SnmEs AD
Tum ADJUSTIMNT (1921) passim and Appendix VII. The usual means of enforcing
awards, granting the right to bargain collectively (where no union was represented in the
plant), was the establishment of a shop committee chosen in an election conducted under
the Board's administrators. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, NATioNAL WAR LA OR BOARD
(1922) 25, 58, 243. These shop organizations, instead of developing into industrial unions
became instead company unions. See Leiseron, Company Unions (1931) 4 ENcyc. OF Soc.
Sci. 123. The policy of the National War Labor Board in outlawing the attempts of
"outside" unions to penetrate hitherto unorganized plants and the restriction of its efforts
to the conduct of a free election is strikingly similar to the action of the present Labor
Board. Cf., however, questionnaires sent to the railroads by Coordinator Eastman in ad-
ministering the labor provisions of the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933,
evidencing an attempt to forestall employer domination of unions not affiliated with nation-
wide organizations by prohibiting employers from financing them and otherwise controll-
ing them. N. Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1933, at 2.
59. "The employee election, supervised by the Labor Board had come to be a set
formula for use in clearing up disputes growing out of § 7a of the National Recovery Act."
U. S. Law Week, Dec. 19, 1933, at 302.
60. The Weirton Steel Co. of Weirton, W. Va., refused to follow the orders of the
National Labor Board for a government supervised election of company workers to de-
termine who should represent them in collective bargaining. In direct challenge of the
power of the N. R. A. to apply its method of settling labor problems, the company super-
vised its own election under rules set up by its officials. The result was an almost unanim-
ous vote for the company union. See account in (1933) 77 NEW REPUBLIC 183. The
Weirton case is only one of many instances in which the decision of the Board has been
defied by the management. In the Matter of Edward J. Budd Manufacturing Co. Case
No. 146, Dec. 14, 1933, the company announced that a shop organization would be formed;
an election was held and the company prepared the constitution and by-laws of the or-
ganization. Attempts to form a union had been made prior to the election and a charter
was granted to the employees by the United Automobile Workers Union, affiliated with
the American Federation of Labor. The company refused to recognize this union, stating
that it already had satisfactory employee representation. A strike was then called in which
1500 men participated. On failure of the company to accept the recommendations of the
Philadelphia Regional Labor Board the matter was referred to the National Labor Board
before which the Company refused to appear. The Board in its decree recited Section
7a and declared: "The summary rejection by an employer of the demands of a committee
of workers and the immediate cessation of work by employees do not constitute col-
lective bargaining. There is a mutual lack of -understanding." (italics supplied). The
Board ruled that the strike be called off immediately and that an election be held within
30 days under supervision of the Labor Board and that the men be reinstated. The
strike was called off, but the Budd Company has ignored the decree. U. S. Law Week,
Dec. 19, 1933, at 5. Another example of the refusal of employers to accept collective
Assuming that the decree of the Board is supported in the courts,6 1 the per-
manence of the result, unsupported by the independent ability of the union
to hold its own where the employer continues to be recalcitrant, is questionable.
62
Moreover, in addition to the dubious legal effect of an award that an outside
union, duly chosen, shall be recognized by the employer,6 3 the significance of
a verbal acquiescence in the decision by the company 64 can depend only upon
the economic pressure which the organization can put behind its demands. It
is unnecessary to insist that an abstract declaration by the administration that
bargaining is that of two shipbuilding corporations in New York, United Dry Docks In-
corporated and Todd Ship Building Company, which, the Regional Labor Board claims, re-
fused to negotiate with representatives of their 4000 employees who were on a strike for
seven weeks. See N. Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1933.
61. Since the Labor Board has no independent power to enforce its awards the prose-
cution may proceed on the theory that refusal to abide by its disposition is a violation of
Section 7a as embodied in the Steel Code. That extra-legal pressure may not be sufficient
to effect compliance with the decrees of such a body was evident, during the late war,
when the President was forced to commandeer the Western Union Telephone and Telegraph
Company and the Smith and Weston Arms Company for refusing to follow similar awards
enforcing collective bargaining. See BLnG, op. cit. supra note 58. And even in war-time a
court refused to enforce an award against a company which refused to arbitrate. Parker
v. First Trust and Savings Bank, 266 Fed. 961 (C. C. A. 9th, 1920).
62. The impressive gains in union membership made since the inception of the N. R. A.
[see LABOR, Oct. 3, 1933, at 14] are matched by the vast increases achieved by the Amer-
ican Federation of Labor under similar conditions during and immediately after the World
War. A steep decline in membership followed the war years, until unions decreased to a
size below that of the period of expansion. See LoRwIN, TnE AmEnc~x FEDERATION OF
LABOR (1933) 484. Summing up the net resultants of labor's cooperation during the late
war, Mir. Lorwin says: "The government's personnel, consisting of men drawn from the
universities and the professions, who were impressed with the possibility of utilizing a
'war for democracy' to democratize American industry, were slow in hammering out a new
labor policy, and not always able to enforce it. On the other hand, the government's
concessions to organized labor came piecemeal and gradually, only as serious difficulties
arose in an industry. And, as a rule, the government machinery worked best in plants
and industries in which strong unions had existed before the outbreak of the war. .
These gains were considerable, but they do not indicate that labor exploited its unusual
war opportunities to the full. They show that organized labor was prevented to some
extent from making as good a bargain as it might have through unregulated action ...
Gompers and his associates, subjected to pressure and flattery from high sources, were
tempted to relax their vigilance for labor's interests, and were ready to make what they
regarded as necessary compromises . . ."1 Id. at 170-172.
63. In In re Berkeley Woolen Mills, N. R. A. Official Release No. 739, Sept. 12, 1933,
the Labor Board declared that refusal to deal with "outside" union representatives was a
violation of the Textile Code. A similar attitude on recognition was taken by General
Johnson [N. R. A. Official Release No. 625, Sept. 4, 1933], and by Senator Wagner [N. R. A.
Official Release No. 993, Oct. 3, 1933]. However, the opinion of the Labor Board is not
binding on the courts, and the cases are as yet in confusion. See notes 11, 14, 36 and 52,
supra.
64. See editorial from IaoN AGE, quoted in (1934) 77 NEw R!Pzu c 211.
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a bargan satisfactory to labor's interests shall be arrived at,65 can have neither
substance nor permanence where the terms of the contemplated agreement do
not represent the actual balance of economic power between the "contracting"
parties.
The fundamental conception of the trade agreement is that of collective
bargaining rather than arbitration, and the essential difference between the two
is that the latter involves the intervention of a third party. The collective
agreement is made by direct negotiation between the two organized groups,
and the sanction which each holds over the other is the strike or the lockout.
Arbitration* is applicable where certain premises embodied in a contract or
otherwise sanctioned by mutual acquiescence constitute a foundation for settle-
ment; application of principle and determination of fact can then resolve
the dispute. Such a body of doctrine has been developed to some extent in
the course of functioning of the arbitration machinery provided in trade agree-
ments by the Amalgamated Clothing Workers and similar organizations. 0 It
has been pointed out, however, that even the procedure of such boards has
little resemblance to true arbitration, which is a judicial process exemplified
in the settlement of most points of commercial contracts. Since the "arbitra-
tors" in labor disputes are chosen by each side as advocates rather than as im-
partial interpreters of the agreement, the function of the unbiased member
chosen by the opposing parties is simply to effect a compromise. The char-
acter of industrial arbitration as a purely voluntary proceeding, yielding
at every point to the underlying economic realities, is reflected in provisions,
ubiquitous in trade agreements, to the effect that the union and the employer
may insist at any time on the right to refuse arbitration.67 The Labor Board's
decisions on union statutes, hours, wages and similar issues can in the same way
be only a resultant of the relative bargaining strength of the contending parties;
with the difference that even the rudimentary consensual principles laid down
in the trade agreement are lacking.68 In the absence of a generally accepted
65. In In re H. W. Anthony Mill (on the complaint of the American Federation of
Full Fashioned Hosiery Workers to interpret an agreement between the parties and the
Board that employees should "elect their representatives to deal with the management in
working out agreements dealing with relationship of employees and employer") when the
employers claimed that they had satisfied their obligation merely by permitting an elec-
tion, the Labor Board interpreted the agreement as requiring not only bargaining, but
the achievement of a bargain. See ThE HosIERY WORKERS, Sept. 29, 1933, at 1, quoted in
Note (1933) 47 HARv. L. REV. 85, 118 n.
66. See PR~x.La, op. cit. supra note 42, at 144; LoRwnr, op. cit. supra note 62, at 201;
Gulick, Some Economic Aspects of the N. 1R. A. (1933) 33 COL. L. REV. 1103.
67. See BuDIsH Aura SOULE, THE NEw UNioNsM n imT CLromraG ImDusTr (1920);
Phillips, The Function of Arbitration in Industrial Disputes (1933) 33 COL. L. R.v. 1372;
and Atchison, Topeka Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brotherhood, 26 F. (2d) 413 (C. C. A. 7th, 1928).
68. See Higgins, A New Province for Law and Order (1915) 29 HARv. L. Rnv. 13,
describing the attempt of the head of the Australian Commonwealth Conciliation Court to
determine "fair and reasonable conditions of remuneration" as the "the normal needs of
an average employee regarded as a human being in a civilized community."
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set of principles for wage adjustment whereby it may be determined what are
fair profits and fair wages in periods of rising and falling prices, the possibility
of true industrial arbitration is unrealizable, 69 and the phrase can only in-
adequately disguise another process in which, under pressure of a passing wave
of public opinion, capital and labor call a truce and submit to the writing of
their contracts by third parties. In a period of depression and labor surplus,
however, it may well be that labor should accept the fiction in order to reap
advantages which it is in no position to gain for itself, disregarding for the time
the warning of its experience following the expansion of the war period.
The undependable nature of the gains for labor following upon the theory
of the N. R. A. that the fundamental differences between labor and capital are
arbitrable, would not occasion great concern were it not for the fact that the
assumption entails a weakening or elimination of the indispensable conditions
by which labor can meet capital on its own ground.70 Compulsory arbitration
by depriving labor of the right to strike for its demands undermines the essential
economic justification for the existence of unions, leaving the employer in pos-
session of both the right to arbitrate and the power to dictate terms by force
majeur on the economic front. The requirement that industrial disputes be re-
ferred to the National Labor Board before resort to the strike may be had is
only less drastic.71 Prolongation of the status quo enables the employer to
come to the conference in possession of a prima facie case which it is incumbent
upon the union to overthrow; postponement of the inevitable joining of issue
in the economic field permits the company to stock up on merchandise, assure
69. Judge Ellison described his experience as an arbitrator in the following terms:
"It is for the employer's advocate to put the men's wages as low as he can. It is for the
men's advocate to put them as high as he can. And, when you have done that, it is for
me to deal with the question as well as I can, but on what principle I have to deal with it
I have not the slightest idea. There is no principle of law involved in it. There is no
principle of political economy involved in it." Quoted in Br.u-r, op. cit. supra note 56, at
347.
70. "In the United States, Canada and Great Britain, the workers have almost in-
variably opposed any restriction of the right to strike . . . In all these countries Labor
has felt that it stood to gain by having its hands left free for a fight on the industrial
field." The advantages of an industrial peace based on the status quo are not patent
to a class which is progressively moving upward. BLurm, op. cit. supra note 56, at 281. See
COLE, WORLD OF LABOR (1919) 319; "Organized Labor must at all costs preserve the right
to strike; and no boon which the state can give in return can compensate for the loss of.
that supreme and final defense."
71. Voluntary arbitration in itself may be an aid to true collective bargaining between
union and company, since it may induce the disputants to move their sticking points under
the influence of public opinion and clarified issues. The weaker party stands to gain from
the publicity and intervention of relatively impartial negotiators in achieving a compromise
where it would have gotten nothing by direct negotiation. However, labor may safely
favor arbitration instead of unalloyed collective bargaining when its economic position is
weak only if it does not relinquish in the process the opportunity of achieving sufficient




itself of sufficient hands, take measures to suppress discontent in the plant and
enlist the sympathy of the public in its behalf. Meanwhile the long delay pre-
ceding arbitration deprives the strike of the element of surprise which is its
principal advantage in a period of labor surplus; without cessation of produc-
tion, shortage of the product, enthusiasm of the men and support of the public
the chances of success are small indeed. The tenacity with which labor has
in the past fought curbs on the right to strike has been justified by the position
in which labor has found itself when deprived of that power; it may not be too
soon to observe that the process may now be repeating itself in the N. R. A.
THE FEDERAL LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR
WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT
UNwoRmITY was not discovered by the Supreme Court to be established and
required by the Constitution as a characteristic of maritime law until 1917,
when in Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen' the Court concluded that exten-
sion of state workmen's compensation acts to employees injured in maritime
employment on navigable waters would lead to "destruction of the very uni-
formity in respect to maritime matters which the Constitution was designed to
establish."'2 By this decision some 300,000 longshoremen and harbor workers,
many of them engaged in highly dangerous occupations, were deprived of a
compensatory remedy for their injuries. Uniformity achieved with such disas-
trous results never met with the acquiescence of Congress, which twice there-
after enacted legislation permitting state acts to extend to maritime workers.
But the Supreme Court was not to be persuaded; encroachments on "uniformity"
could not be approved even when thus authorized by Congress.3 The resulting
1. 244 U. S. 205 (1917). See Conlen, Ten Years of the Jensen Case (1928) 76 U. or
PA. L. Rv. 926.
2. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, supra note 1, at 217. The only provision in the Con-
stitution concerning admiralty jurisdiction appears in Art. III, Sec. 2, Cl. 1, wherein it is
stated that "The judicial Power [of the United States] shall extend . . . to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction"
3. By § 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 STAT. 77 (1789), the District Courts of the
United States were given "exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction; . . . saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law
remedy, where the common law is competent to give it." This provision was carried into
§§ 24 and 256 of the Judicial Code, 36 STAT. 1091, 1160, 1161 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §§ 41(3),
371 (1926). After the Jensen decision Congress amended the saving clause to read: "saving
to suitors in all cases the right of a common-law remedy where the common law is com-
petent to give it, and to claimants the rights and remedies under the workmen's compensa-
tion law of any State." 40 STAT. 395 (1917), 28 U. S. C. § 371 (1926). This amendment
was declared unconstitutional in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149 (1920),
on the ground that delegation in this manner to the individual states would defeat the uni-
formity of maritime rules. Congress, believing that the requirement of uniformity could
be met by excepting seamen from the operation of state acts, then modified the saving
clause to read: "saving to suitors in all cases the right of a common-law remedy where
[Vol. 43
unfortunate predicament of maritime employees, given only a tort remedy sub-
ject to the defenses of fellow servant, assumption of risk, and contributory
negligence,4 hardly afforded a satisfactory solution to the problem. It was not
surprising, therefore, that in subsequent cases the courts, seeking to secure
compensation for injured claimants, extended the jurisdiction of state acts
wherever possible. Thus it was declared that maritime employees injured on
dock or on shore were within the states' jurisdiction. 5 More significant, how-
ever, was the development of the doctrine that even injuries occurring upon
navigable waters were compensable under state law if the claimant's employ-
ment was of "mere local concern," and not of general maritime importance.
6
The decision in the Jensen case was thus followed by a decade of increasing
confusion as to the limits of the federal courts' admiralty jurisdiction, and by
similarly increasing dissatisfaction with the lack of proper compensation for
injured maritime employees. It was not until 1927, however, that Congress,
acting upon the suggestion made by the Supreme Court in 1924 that a federal
act providing the desired compensation would be a proper solution of the
difficulty, 7 enacted the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act.8
the common law is competent to give it, and to claimants for compensation for injuries
to or death of persons other than the master or members of the crew of a vessel, their rights
and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any State, District, Territory, or
possession of the United States." 42 STAT. 635 (1922), 28 U. S. C. § 371 (1926). In
holding this modification to be unconstitutional the Supreme Court found the exception
of master and crew "wholly insufficient to meet the objections to such enactments here-
tofore often pointed out." State of Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U. S. 219,
223 (1924). See Morrison, Workmen's Compensation and the Maritime Law (1929) 38
YALE L. J. 472.
4. This was the case at least until 1926, when it was decided in International Stevedoring
Co. v. Haverty, 272 U. S. 50 (1926), that stevedores injured on shipboard are seamen
within the purview of the Jones Act [§ 33 of the Merchant Marine Act, 41 STAT. 1007
(1920), 46 U. S. C. § 688 (1926)J, which gives seamen injured in the course of their em-
ployment the privilege of suing for damages at law under the same statutory provisions
that apply in the case of injured railway employees.
5. State Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U. S. 263 (1922).
6. Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U. S. 469 (1922); Gillard's Case, 244
Mass. 47, 138 N. E. 384 (1923). The Rolhde case held that under the local concern doctrine
a workman injured on a partially completed ship after it had been launched could recover
under state compensation laws. Similar conclusions were reached with respect to a diver
removing an underwater obstruction to navigation thirty-five feet from shore, Millers' In-
demnity Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U. S. 59 (1926); a fisherman launching a small boat
through the surf, Alaska Packers' Association v. Industrial Accident Commission, 276 U. S.
467 (1928); and employees working on floating log booms, Sultan Ry. & Timber Co. v.
Department of Labor, 277 U. S. 135 (1928).
7. "Without doubt Congress has power to alter, amend, or revise the maritime law by
statutes of general application embodying its will and judgment. This power, we think,
would permit enactment of a general employers' liability law, or general provisions for
compensating injured employees; but it may not be delegated to the several States.' State of
Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., supra note 3, at 227.
8. 44 STAr. 1424 (1927), 33 U. S. C. Suprp. VI §§ 901-950 (1932). The Act is admin-
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With federal compensation made available to maritime employees by this
legislation, the determination of what employments are in state and what in
admiralty jurisdiction has lost much of its importance. The question still has
significance, however, largely because employers have not known under what
acts they should insure,9 and because employees have been unable to deter-
mine where they should seek compensation. The traditional rule of maritime
law that admiralty has jurisdiction only over those torts occurring below the
ebb and flow of the tide' ° was complicated, during the decade following the
Jensen case, by the development of the "local concern" doctrine; with the in-
troduction by that rule of the contract basis of distinction, the nature of the
matters dealt with, it became impossible to determine jurisdiction merely by
reference to the locus of the accident. The confusion created by the combination
of these tests has been perpetuated under the Longshoremen's Act, which pro-
vides merely that federal compensation shall be payable only if recovery "may
not validly be provided by State law."" It has been held that a workman put-
istered by the U. S. Employees' Compensation Commission, through deputy commissioners
appointed by the commission. In the absence of court decisions, the deputy commissioners
are bound to interpret the Act in accordance with instructions issued from time to time by
the commission. U. S. EMPLOYEE'S CONTENSATION COMMISSION, SncTEENTr ANNuAL RE-
PoR (1932) 37-39.
9. "In some industries over the country, especially upon the navigable rivers, business
concerns have been required to insure, first, under the State compensation law; second,
under the longshoremen's act; and third, to take a policy to cover their admiralty or mari-
time liability to the crews of their vessels. In some cases it appears that they have been
required to pay premium on each of these three insurances upon the entire pay roll of the
company." U. S. EMPLOYFES' CompmsATior ComrassioN, TWEL= AmUAL REPORT
(1928) 38.
10. The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20, 33 (U. S. 1865).
11. § 3, subsec. (a). Regarding this provision the Supreme Court has declared: "In
limiting the application of the Act to cases where recovery 'through workmen's compensa-
tion proceedings may not validly be provided by State law,' the Congress evidently had in
view the decisions of this Court with respect to the scope of the exclusive authority of the
national legislature." Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 39 (1932).
The full text of § 3 reads: "(a) Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in
respect of disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or death results
from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any
dry dock) and if recovery for the disability or death through workmen's compensation
proceedings may not validly be provided by State law. No compensation shall be payable
in respect of the disability or death of (1) A master or member of a crew of any vessel,
nor any person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under
eighteen tons net; or (2) An officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof
or of any State or foreign government, or of any political subdivision thereof. (b) No
compensation shall be payable if the injury was occasioned solely by the intoxication of
the employee or by the willful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or another."
Master and crew were excluded from the operation of the Act apparently at the request
of the Seamen's Union, because it was feared that their inclusion might deprive them of
their time-honored rights to maintenance and cure, and to damages for injuries occasioned
by unseaworthiness, and perhaps also of their benefits under the Jones Act, supra note 4.
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ting the finishing touches on a new vessel, afloat and practically completed, must
if injured seek recovery under state compensation laws because shipbuilding is
said to be of mere local concern.12 And yet, if the vessel has been completely
remodeled, instead of newly constructed, a workman injured in the same cir-
cumstances must recover under the Longshoremen's Act.13 The employee
sweeping garbage on a scavenger scow is solely within state jurisdiction,'1 4 but
if by chance he is injured while stenciling cross-ties loaded on a barge, 15 or
braking freight cars on a railroad ferryboat,' 6 he must obtain compensation
under the federal Act.
It is clear that injuries occurring above the ebb and flow of the tide should
in all cases be compensable under state laws.1 7 But while a rule that all in-
juries occurring below the ebb and flow of the tide are covered by the Long-
shoremen's Act would perhaps promote the uniformity in maritime matters
advocated by the Court in the Jensen case, and would simplify the definition
of the bounds of the federal jurisdiction, the "local concern" rule could serve
a function probably not contemplated by the courts that developed it. Without
this doctrine, employers engaged in essentially non-maritime occupations, but
whose employees upon occasion do work aboard ship, would find it necessary
to carry compensation insurance under both the federal and state laws. Thus
a merchant carrying on a local business and insuring under a state compensa-
tion law would be liable under the Longshoremen's Act if his employee were
injured while temporarily working on shipboard. It would seem, therefore,
that the locality test should be qualified to bring within admiralty jurisdiction
only employments, such as stevedoring and the building and repair of ships,
which normally and habitually require the workers' presence below the ebb and
flow of the tide. Such an application of the "local concern" doctrine upon the
basis of the nature of the employer's business, instead of according to the char-
acter of the work which the employee was doing when injured, would, it is true,
involve minor encroachments upon the uniformity of the traditional jurisdiction
of admiralty; but the objections to such encroachments hardly outweigh the
advantages to be gained in avoiding the necessity for duplication of insurance
and in establishing a more workable line of demarcation between the juris-
diction of state and federal acts.
HEA INoS BEFORE SENATE CoMarrrs ON = JurrciARy ON S. 3170, 69th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1926) at 17.
12. United States Casualty Co. v. Taylor, 64 F. (2d) 521 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933), cert.
den., 54 Sup. Ct. 56 (1933). The injured workman attempted to recover under the Long-
shoremen's Act, but was denied compensation because, had there been a state compensation
act where his injury occurred (South Carolina), such an act could validly have provided
for his recovery.
13. Lake Washington Shipyards v. Brueggeman, 56 F. (2d) 655 (W. D. Wash. 1931).
14. In re Herbert's Case, 186 N. E. 554 (Mass. 1933).
15. Moss Tie Co. v. Tanner, 44 F. (2d) 928 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930).
16. Buren v. Southern Pacific Co., 50 F. (2d) 407 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931).
17. The Act is expressly limited in its application to injuries occurring on navigable waters.
Section 3, subsec. (a), supra note 11. See Crowell v. Benson, supra note 11, at 55; cf. The
Plymouth, supra note 10.
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A locality test as thus modified to take into account the practical problems
of insurance permits ready disposition of the other questions of admiralty
jurisdiction that have arisen under the Act. Injuries occurring upon marine rail-
ways have in some cases been held compensable under the Longshoremen's
Act upon the ground that such railways are similar in function to dry docks,18
which are expressly included within the scope of the Act. 19 But dry docks,
though at times free of water, are below the ebb and flow of the tide, and have
traditionally been considered within maritime jurisdiction; 20 marine railways,
on the other hand, carry a vessel on dry land. Compensation for injuries occur-
ring upon the latter should therefore be secured under the state acts.21 A fur-
ther question as to the applicability of the Longshoremen's Act arises under
the provision2 2 that an employer's liability under the Act shall be exclusive of
all other liability. Railroad employees injured while working on vessels owned
or operated by their employer have contended that this provision does not preju-
dice their rights under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.2 3  In an action
under the latter statute the Supreme Court denied recovery to a freight handler
injured on the deck of a car float, upon the ground that the Longshoremen's
Act provided an exclusive remedy.24  Since railroads that operate car floats
or other vessels are "normally and habitually" engaged in a maritime occupa-
tion, they may well be required to insure under the Longshoremen's Act. The
18. U. S. EMpi-oEES' COMPENSATION COMrnSSION, OP=NIONS ON THE LONGSHOREmN'S
AcT, Nos. 1 and 2 (1927), No. 28 (1928); Continental Casualty Co. v. Lawson, 64 F. (2d)
802 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933). The terms "marine railway" and "dry dock" ordinarily refer to
different kinds of structures. The marine railway extends from the land into and under
the water. In hauling a vessel, a car known as a cradle is run down into the water; the
vessel is floated into the cradle, and vessel and cradle are pulled up on land by machinery.
There are two generally recognized types of dry dock: the floating dock, which lifts the
ship as the water is pumped from the chambers of the dock; and the graving or "graven"
dock, permanently attached to land.
19. § 3, subsec. (a), supra note 11.
20. Gonsalves v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 266 U. S. 171 (1924).
21. The courts so held in Colonna's Shipyard, Inc. v. Lowe, 22 F. (2d) 843 (E. D.
Va. 1927), and Norton v. Vesta Coal Co., 63 F. (2d) 165 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1933), cert.
granted, 54 Sup. Ct. 60 (1933).
22. §5.
23. 35 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U. S. C. §§ 51-59 (1926).
24. Nogueira v. New York, New Haven, and Hartford Rr. Co., 281 U. S. 128 (1930),
aff'g 32 F. (2d) 179 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929). In this case the injured workman was in front
of a hand truck, assisting in lowering it down an inclined plank from the dock to a car
float. Through the alleged negligence of those behind it, the truck got out of control and
skidded down the plank, pushing Nogueira before it and crushing him against the deck of
the float. Plaintiff and his fellow employees were thus technically on land when the re-
lease of the truck, which ultimately gave rise to the injury, occurred. This fact, had it
been argued, might well have withdrawn Nogueira from the jurisdiction of the Long-
shoremen's Act and placed him within the act under which he had brought suit. Cf. Smith
& Son v. Taylor, 276 U. S. 179 (1928).
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Court's holding that railroad employees injured while working below the ebb
and flow of the tide must recover under that Act therefore seems desirable. 20 5
The Supreme Court's decision in Crowell v. Benson26 aroused apprehension
among commentators 27 lest the determination of admiralty jurisdiction in the
facts of a particular case might become as great a source of difficulty in apply-
ing the Longshoremen's Act as the definition of the extent of that jurisdiction
had already proved. The Court in that case held that the questions of whether
the injury occurred upon the navigable waters of the United States, and of
whether the relation of master and servant existed, were "fundamental and
jurisdictional," and that upon such questions the federal district court in re-
viewing an order of the commission must give a trial de novo.2-  With refer-
ence to the first of the Court's "jurisdictional" facts, however, disputes can
seldom arise; whether an accident occurs above or below the ebb and flow of
the tide is ordinarily readily demonstrable. And with regard to the second
question to which it referred in the Crowell case, the Supreme Court has itself
recently removed from the category of jurisdictional fact the most likely source
of controversy. In Voehl v. Indemnity Insurance Company of North America
29
the Court held that upon the issue of "whether the injury arose out of and in
the course of employment ... there can be no doubt of the power of the Con-
gress to invest the deputy commissioner, as it has invested him, with authority
to determine these questions after proper hearing and upon sufficient evidence.
And when the deputy commissioner, following the course prescribed by the
statute, makes such a determination, his findings of fact supported by evidence
must be deemed to be conclusive." This decision, and the apparent reluctance
of the lower federal courts"° to extend the "jurisdictional fact" doctrine beyond
the two precise issues stated by the Court in Crowell v. Benson, indicate that the
restrictions imposed by that case will not unduly hamper the administration
of the Longshoremen's Act.
Aside from problems of jurisdiction, a number of questions involving inter-
pretations of the Longshoremen's Act have arisen. Some difficulty has been
occasioned by the provision that no compensation is payable to "any person
engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under eigh-
teen tons net."'31 The manifest injustice that would be done if this provision
were interpreted to include employees of large boat repair concerns working
25. In accord: Buren v. Southern Pacific Co., supra note 16; Richardson v. Central Rr.
Co. of New Jersey, 233 App. Div. 603, 253 N. Y. Supp. 789 (2d Dep't 1931).
26. Supra note 11.
27. See Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson: Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations
of Questions of "Constitutional Pact" (1932) 80 U. oF PA. L. Rlv. 1055; Comment (1932)
41 YALn L. J. 1037; Note (1933) 46 HAv. L. REv. 478.
28. Crowell v. Benson, supra note 11, at 55.
29. 288 U. S. 162, 166 (1933).
30. Powell v. Hoage, 57 F. (2d) 766 (App. D. C. 1932); Baltimore & Ohio Rr. Co. v.
Clark, 59 F. (2d) 595 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932); Georgia Casualty Co. v. Hoage, 59 F. (2d)
870 (App. D. C. 1932); Pacific Employers' Insurance Co. v. Pillsbury, 61 F. (2d) 101 (C.
C. A. 9th, 1932); Todd Dry Docks, Inc. v. Marshall, 61 F. (2d) 671 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932);
Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Sheppeard, 62 F. (2d) 122 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932).
31. §3, subsec. (a), supra note 11.
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on vessels of less than eighteen tons has prompted the compensation commission
to declare that employees, to be included within this section, must have been
engaged directly by the master, and for the specific purpose of loading, unload-
ing, or repairing.32 A further problem has arisen with regard to the statement
in the Act that "In the case of an employer who is a subcontractor, the con-
tractor shall be liable for and shall secure the payment of such compensation
to employees of the subcontractor unless the subcontractor has secured such
payment."33  The claim has been made34 that, with a ship or cargo owner as
contractor, this provision relieves a stevedoring concern as subcontractor from
the duty of furnishing compensation to its injured employees. But it does not
seem reasonable that Congress intended to deprive the injured longshoreman
of his remedy against the very company that employs him. Rather it would
appear that this provision is designed to give the longshoreman an additional
remedy against the contractor in case the stevedoring company should fail to
provide for his relief. A third question arises in connection with the election
open to an injured employee either to receive compensation under the Act
or to recover damages against a third person alleged to be responsible for the
injury; acceptance of compensation is made to operate as an assignment to
the employer of all of the claimant's rights against such third person.35 This
assignment, resulting automatically from the acceptance of any compensation,
with or without an award, is frequently a source of injustice, for employees
fail to realize the consequences of accepting a small compensation installment.30
It has been suggested that the automatic assignment of these rights should be
contingent upon the acceptance of compensation under a commissioner's award.
37
That the Longshoremen's Act has been highly successful in remedying the
unfortunate predicament into which longshoremen and harbor workers were
cast by the Jensen and succeeding decisions cannot be doubted. Through June
32. OPniows oN = E LONGsnopmrmq's AcT, supra note 18, No. 11 (1927). An em-
ployee of a repair concern is not deprived of compensation because he is working on a
vessel of less than eighteen tons. "The obvious purpose of the subsection is to prevent
the master of a small vessel from creating a liability against the owner." Continental Cas-
ualty Co. v. Lawson, supra note 18, at 805.
33. § 4, subsec. (a).
34. Globe Stevedoring Co. v. Peters, 57 F. (2d) 256 (S. D. Tex. 1931); Houston Ship
Channel Stevedoring Co. v. Sheppeard, 57 F. (2d) 259 (S. D. Tex. 1931).
35. § 33, subsec. (a) and (b). Under this section it has been held that injured long-
shoremen or their representatives are entitled to a recovery in rem against a vessel as a
third person. The Pacific Pine, 31 F. (2d) 152 (W. D. Wash. 1929); The Nicoline Maersk,
53 F. (2d) 103 (D. Mass. 1931). But the unseaworthiness of the ship or the negligence
of the crew must be the proximate cause of the injury, The Aden Maru, 51 F. (2d) 599
(S. D. Tex. 1931), and it must appear that no direct relationship of employer and em-
ployee existed between the ship owner and the injured worker, Samuels v. Munson Steam-
ship Line, Inc., 63 F. (2d) 861 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933).
36. Hunt v. Bank Line, Ltd., 35 F. (2d) 136 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929); Sciortino v. Dimon
Steamship Corp., 39 F. (2d) 210 (E. D. N. Y. 1930).
37. U. S. EinLoYEEs' CompNmsATox CoarissioN, SEvz.NTi" AmNUAL REORT
(1933) 18.
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30, 1933, settlements had been made or compensation paid, with or without
award, in 71,155 cases. Of the 186,410 cases disposed of by deputy commis-
sioners during this period,38 only 352, or less than two-tenths of one per cent,3 9
have been appealed. 40 The jurisdictional entanglements of the Act with state
compensation laws and with the Federal Employers' Liability statute, and the
added insurance burden imposed upon employers, arise not from defects in the
Act itself, but from the fact that the scope of its operation is inevitably re-
stricted within the narrow limits of admiralty jurisdiction. Anticipation of these
difficulties probably explains in part the unwillingness of Congress to enact
this legislation without first exhausting other possibilities. Had the Supreme
Court, instead of sacrificing maritime employees to the, omnivorous doctrine
of uniformity, found some means of bringing them within the field of state
compensation, the injustice and confusion inherent in the very existence of a
federal act would have been avoided.
38. Including cases reopened by commissioners and later closed.
39. The smallness of this figure is partially explained by the fact that, where jurisdiction
is denied, compensation is frequently obtainable under state laws. There are only four
states that have no workmen's compensation act (Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi, and South
Carolina).
40. Figures from the U. S. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION Commussiox, AxNUAL REPORTS
1928-1933.
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